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Abstract
This thesis engages with questions on the boundary between what has tradition-
ally been understood as social and natural. The introductory essay contextu-
alizes the specific contributions of the included papers, by noting and exploring
a reinvigoration of “naturalism” (the notion of a continuity between the human
realm and the rest of natural phenomena) under the banner of Complexity Sci-
ence. This notion is put under explicit light, by revisiting the age-old question of
naturalism and connecting ideas in complexity science with the work of e.g. Roy
Bhaskar, Mario Bunge, William Wimsatt, and David Lane. A philosophical foun-
dation for a complexity science of societal systems is thereby sketched, taking the
form of an integrative and methodologically pluralist “complex realism”.
The first two papers provide a theoretical perspective on the distinction be-
tween social and natural: Paper I notes that societal systems combine two qual-
ities that are commonly referred to as complexity and complicatedness into an
emergent quality that we refer to as “wickedness”, and that is fundamentally and
irreducibly different from either quality in isolation. This explains the recalci-
trance of societal systems to the powerful approaches that exist for dealing with
both of these qualities in isolation, and implies that they indeed ought to be treated
as a distinct class of systems. Paper II uses the plane spanned by complexity and
complicatedness to categorize seven different system classes, providing a system-
atic perspective on the study of societal systems.
The suggested approach to societal systems following from these conclusions
is exemplified by three studies in different fields and empirical contexts. Paper
III combines a number of theories that can be seen as responses to wickedness, in
the form of evolutionary developmental theories and theories of societal change,
to develop a synthetic theory for cultural evolution. Paper IV exemplifies how
simulation can be integrated with social theory for the study of emergent effects
in societal systems, contributing a network model to investigate how the struc-
tural properties of free social spaces impact the diffusion of collective mobiliza-
tion. Paper V exemplifies how digital trace data analysis can be integrated with
qualitative social science, by using topic modeling as a form of corpus map to
aid critical discourse analysis, implying a view of formal methods as aids for
qualitative exploration, rather than as part of a reductionist approach.
Keywords: Complexity, Naturalism, Critical Realism, Wicked Systems, Tran-
sitions, Evolutionary Developmental Theory, Digital Trace Data, Social Move-
ments, Innovation Society
List of publications
I. Claes Andersson, Anton Törnberg, Petter Törnberg. “Societal Systems -
Complex or Worse?”, Futures 63, 145-157 (2014).
CA, PT, AT developed the idea, and CA wrote the paper with contributions from
PT and AT.
II. Claes Andersson, Petter Törnberg. “Innovation and the Anatomy of Wicked-
ness”, (Submitted).
CA, PT developed the idea, and CA wrote the paper with contributions from PT.
III. Claes Andersson, Anton Törnberg, Petter Törnberg. “An evolutionary de-
velopmental approach to cultural evolution”, Current Anthropology 55, 2
(2014).
CA, PT, AT developed the idea, and CA wrote the paper with contributions from
PT and AT.
IV. Anton Törnberg, Petter Törnberg. “Combining CDA and topic model-
ing: Analyzing discursive connections between Islamophobia and anti-
feminism on an online forum”, Discourse & Society 27, 401-422 (2016).
PT, AT developed the idea, PT collected the data, PT developed and ran model, AT
conducted qualitative analysis, AT wrote the paper with contributions from PT.
V. Anton Törnberg, Petter Törnberg. “Modeling Free Social Spaces - Diffu-
sion of Complex Contention”, Social Movement Studies, (online first).
PT, AT developed the idea, PT developed the model, PT conducted analysis, PT,
AT wrote paper.
Publications not in this thesis
Claes Andersson, Anton Törnberg, Petter Törnberg. “Developing of the
future: scaffolded Darwinism in societal evolution”, Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 0140-525X, (2013).
Claes Andersson, Petter Törnberg. “Fidelity and the speed of the tread-
mill: The combined impact of population size, transmission fidelity, and
selection on the accumulation of cultural complexity”, American Antiquity
(2016), 81(3), 576-590.
Anton Törnberg, Petter Törnberg. “Muslims in social media discourse:
Combining topic modeling and critical discourse analysis”, Discourse, Con-
text & Media (2016).
Acknowledgements
I wish to acknowledge the support of the EU-FET grants MD (no. 284625),
INSITE (no. 271574) and ODYCCEUS (no. 732942).
I would like to thank my supervisor, Claes Andersson, for showing me that
you can survive in academia as an intellectual rather than merely an academic.
My brother Anton Törnberg, David Avra Lane, Kristian Lindgren, Bill Wimsatt,
Maurie Cohen, and Justus Uitermark, for making this thesis possible.
I also want to thank all my wonderful colleagues and friends at Physical Re-
source Theory at Chalmers University of Technology, at Gothenburg University,
at ECLT Ca’Foscari University of Venice, at New Jersey Institute of Technology,
and at the department of sociology at University of Amsterdam.
The synthesis was discussed and contributed greatly to by the participants1 at
the workshops organized in Venice.
Of course, nobody, apart from myself, should be held accountable for the
shortcomings of the arguments presented in this thesis.
Gothenburg, February 2017
Petter Törnberg
1Including Manfred Laubichler, Sander van der Leeuw, John Odling-Smee, and Kevin Laland.
For full list of participants, see the workshop series at www.insiteproject.org/slides/new-data/.

Contents
List of publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
I Introductory Essay: On the Limits of Complex Naturalism 1
Introduction 3
1 Epistemological & Ontological Limits 10
1.1 Beyond the Open/Closed Dichotomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Uncertainty in Wicked Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.3 Boundaries of Wicked Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2 Relational Limits 31
2.1 Narratives before Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2 Narratives in Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3 Narratives and Social Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Innovation in Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5 Innovation meets Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3 From Naturalism to Realism 45
3.1 Society in Mainstream Complexity Science . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Fact and Action in Wicked Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 Explanation in Wicked Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
vi
3.4 Data Mining and Categorization in Wicked Systems . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Facing Emergence in Wicked Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Integrated Pluralism - Tying Together Traces . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.7 To Change it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4 Conclusion 70
Paper I: Societal Systems - Complex or Worse? 103
Paper II: Innovation and the Anatomy of Wickedness 119
Paper III: An Evolutionary Developmental Approach to Cul-
tural Evolution 157
Paper IV: Modelling Free Social Spaces and the Diffusion of So-
cial Mobilization 181
Paper V: Combining CDA and Topic Modeling: Analyzing Dis-
cursive Connections Between Islamophobia and Anti-Feminism
on an Online Forum 205
Part I
Introductory Essay: On the Limits of
Complex Naturalism
1

Introduction
The traditional boundaries between natural and social systems seem increasingly
fragile and contested in a world that is now widely seen as having entered into
the geological époque of the Anthropocene (Steffen et al., 2007; Waters et al.,
2016), characterized by human society as the globally dominating shaping force
on Earth’s geology and ecosystems. The idea of the natural world existing inde-
pendently of the social world is increasingly hard to sustain as profound trans-
formations driven by human activity ravage global ecosystems (Moore, 2014).
This changing relationship between the natural and social has highlighted a con-
founding asymmetry, between our capacity to transform the world through tech-
nological innovation, and our profound lack of understanding of the very world
which our own strength has established. Humanity’s effects on nature have been
characterized as a “perfect storm” of interrelated crises of increasing scale and
magnitude (Bai et al., 2015; Crutzen, 2002; Pievani, 2014).
Simultaneously, a host of parallel developments are unfolding in scientific
theory. Old theory and assumptions, in a range of disciplines dominated by nat-
ural scientific methods, are being undermined by an explosion of new data and
analytic methods, in particular centered around notions such as “Big Data” and
“complexity” (e.g. Anderson, 2008; Ball, 2012; Laland et al., 2015). This is both
opening up new opportunities and unveiling deep-rooted problems in traditional
natural scientific approaches, challenging Humean2 notions of causal law, pre-
2Hume is traditionally assigned to an understanding of cause based on regularity, defined as
objects or events X and Y being “constantly conjoined”, i.e. as a necessary connection between Xs
and Ys such that whenever X occurs, Y must follow. This is seen as a precursor to the empiricist
theory of causality, in which causation is reduced to empirical regularities. However, Hume’s own
– rather cryptic and ambigous – wording actually provides two separate definitions, one pointing to
3
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dictability and hierarchy. The onslaught of new data and methods is undermining
basic simplifying assumptions, upon which much of the apparent predictive and
explanatory power of time-tested theory rested, and as a response, new theory
and new models are developing to deal with the revealed complexity of the natu-
ral world. A related pattern of development can be seen in a range of disciplines
traditionally dominated by quantitative and formalist approaches, e.g. in the col-
lapse of the neoclassical paradigm and the pluralist explosion of economic theory
(e.g. Fontana, 2010; Hodgson, 2014), in the Ancient DNA revolution in arche-
ology and paleoanthropology (e.g. Larson et al., 2007; Meyer et al., 2014), in
the questioning of the assumptions of time-scale separation between ecosystem
and evolutionary dynamics in ecology (e.g. Fussmann et al., 2007; Odling-Smee
et al., 2003; Post and Palkovacs, 2009), and in the growing recognition of the lim-
its of the Modern Synthesis within evolutionary theory (e.g. Oyama et al., 2003;
Pigliucci et al., 2010).
New methods developed to respond to the discovered messiness of these sys-
tems enable an extension of formalistic approaches to fields previously consid-
ered outside of their scope. This can be seen within the humanities and social
sciences, where traditional approaches in various realms increasingly have to
compete with computational modeling and large-scale surface studies of digital
trace data. These shift the focus to motifs rather than meaning, but are capable of
finding intricate patterns through brute-forcing of immense data quantities (e.g.
Anderson, 2008; Conte et al., 2012; Macy and Willer, 2002). While these devel-
opments are sprawling and multifaceted, “Complexity Science”3 can be identi-
an objective relation between the objects, and the second pointing to a relation between the objects
and our minds: “Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience.
Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another,
and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in
other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance
of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this
also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition
of cause; and call it, an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the
thought to that other.” (Hume and Beauchamp, 2000, p.60, emphasis in original), and it is subject
to contention whether Hume in fact can be said to have subscribed to a “Humean” concept of
causality (e.g. Baert, 2005).
3This term is contested and describes a discipline with many – often contradictory – directions.
As used in this essay, the term will specifically denote an important direction within the larger
discipline centered around, and developing from, the Santa Fe Institute (see Galison, 1997), rep-
resenting a mainly formalist and simulation-based approach to complexity, with its roots in the
natural sciences, that has proven highly capable of analyzing many types of complex systems that
have otherwise been impenetrable to formal approaches. This direction is what Morin (2008) and
Byrne and Callaghan (2013) refer to as “restricted complexity”.
5fied as one of its most important standard-bearers. Complexity Science focuses
on abstract systemic dynamics that have proven to be powerful sources of analo-
gies across various empirical domains, exemplified by how important factors in
as diverse fields as urban innovation, human travel, animal metabolism, and basic
physics have been found to conform to the same universal scaling laws (Betten-
court et al., 2007; Brockmann et al., 2006; Freedman and Index, 1971). This has
been taken to imply a diminished methodological relevance of the boundaries
between the natural and social world, as both are increasingly understood to be
“complex” (e.g. Gilbert, 2010; Helbing, 2012; Lazer et al., 2009; Mitchell, 2009).
These parallel developments – (i) increasing entanglement between social,
natural and technological systems, (ii) increasing understanding of the complex
nature of many natural systems, and (iii) increased application of natural scientific
methods in social systems with access to new data and methods – together lead
to a situation in which the expanding impact of societal systems on nature –
paradoxically – result in further coaching of society in terms of technological and
natural scientific problems and methods (see also Malm and Hornborg, 2014).
The increasingly fuzzy boundary between natural and societal systems is leading
to a renewed expansion of methodology from the natural to the social sciences.
While there is nothing wrong per se with interdisciplinary transfer, these new
methods come with hard-to-detect stowaways: implicit ontological assumptions
– which may have been debated in their natural scientific contexts long ago but are
now taken for granted – sneak into the study of social systems; meta-theoretical
underpinnings about the nature and organization of systems that are rarely made
explicit. These contain tacit and unexamined answers to questions like: What are
the real entities of the social world (Byrne, 2002, p.136)? Are higher-level organi-
zations (like firms, tribes, and states) fully explainable in terms of the preferences
of their members, or are higher-level organizations also social individuals with
their own properties and powers? Can individual action, meaning, and values be
disregarded in the study of causality in human societies? Questions like these are
not only matters of philosophical curiosity, but have profound implications for
how we can and should research, manage, and think about social systems.
This essay revolves around revisiting, with new complexity-informed eyes, an
age-old notion that is at the heart of all of these questions: naturalism, the idea
of a continuity between the human sciences and the sciences of the rest of natu-
ral phenomena (see also e.g. Bhaskar, 1978; Danto, 1967). Naturalism signifies
Furthermore, the word “science” deserves a note of its own: it is, in this essay, used in the
broader sense, in line with the German “Wissenschaft”, Swedish “vetenskap”, or slavic “nauk”,
which do not include the positivist/formalist connotations of their English counterpart.
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the completion of the Copernican dethroning of man from any meta-natural posi-
tion, advocating that there is no need to appeal to extra-natural qualities – such as
conscience, intentionality or meaning – to account for or understand human so-
ciety. One of the more influential naturalist tendencies, which Khalil (1995) calls
“crude naturalism”, adds to this that the methodology of the natural sciences can
and should be employed also within social science. This flavor of naturalism pro-
poses a unification of the sciences in concordance with positivist principles. This
has furthermore tended to imply a Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm4, associated to
reductionist and scientist notions, that ontologically incorporates a shallow real-
ism, and, methodologically, the type of formalist, linear and equilibrium-based
notions epitomized by neoclassical economics (Blaikie, 2007, p.178).
The defense from social science, to what from their perspective is seen as
disciplinary imperialism (Vinck et al., 2010), has importantly been in the form of
social constructionism, i.e. asserting the role of social action in the production of
a variant social world, and emphasizing that all beliefs are constructions (Byrne,
2002). Influential here has especially been the program that Pawson and Tilley
(1997, p.21) refers to as “hermeneutics II”, which “adds the twist that we can-
not, therefore, get beyond constructions”. This anti-naturalist tradition, traceable
back to Weber and Dilthey (see e.g. Dilthey et al., 1989; Weber, 2009), posits a
methodological cleavage between the natural and social sciences, through a view
of the subject-matter of the social sciences as consisting of meaningful objects,
and hence suggesting that their aim is the elucidation of the meaning of these
objects (Bhaskar, 1978).
The recent reincarnation of naturalism under the banner of Complexity Sci-
ence has, however, come to be seen as a third direction in relation to naturalism, as
it ostensibly does not bear the same “crudeness” as its predecessors. It subscribes
to naturalism but brings a fundamental criticism against the linear, stasis-focused
approaches of the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm, and thereby manages to speak
to both the postmodernist and the positivist traditions (Cilliers, 1998). Com-
plexity Science has been described as going beyond the limits of what is often
called “reductionism” by noting that “the ability to reduce everything to simple
fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and recon-
struct the universe” (Anderson et al., 1972, p.393). Instead emphasis is placed
4This is closely related to the notion of a “clockwork universe” – the scientific paradigm based
on the idea that exact and empirically testable predictions of the future state of a system can be
had, given knowledge of initial conditions and of the universal laws governing the system. This
furthermore includes the implicit assumption that external forces can be either controlled or ex-
cluded. The Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm is also associated with, and the foundation of, the
linear modeling framework, which adds notions of equilibrium, additivity, and homogeneity.
7on the study of how parts interact to form complex systems with global, novel,
emergent qualities and patterns. As Ball (2012, p.IX) puts it, in the Complexity
Science perspective, the traditional conceptualization of naturalism
... remains valid but it often drew on the wrong analogies. So-
ciety does not run along the same predictable, ‘clockwork’ lines as
the Newtonian universe. It is closer to the kind of complex systems
that typically preoccupy statistical physicists today: avalanches and
granular flows, flocks of birds and fish, networks of interaction in
neurology, cell biology and technology. (Ball, 2012, p.IX)
The focus is no longer stasis and equilibria, but non-linearity, far-from-equilibria,
and self-organization (Waldrop, 1993). This has provided a naturalist account that
to many seems more plausible, as social phenomena indeed seem to have more
in common with emergent physical processes – i.e. “collective effect[s] [...] that
cannot be deduced from the microscopic equations of motion in a rigorous way
and that disappears completely when the system is taken apart” (Laughlin, 1999,
p.863), exemplified by superfluidity or the fractional quantum Hall effect – than
with classical Newtonian notions of particles and laws. What remains of tradi-
tional crude naturalism is a clear focus on formalist methods, and an underlying,
implicit notion of complexity science as a step toward “making social science
scientific”: bringing it out from the crude infancy of discursivity and into the
scientific adulthood of mathematical and algorithmic rationalism.
This essay aims to put the naturalist tendency of Complexity Science under
the light of explicit study, and to explore to what extent this “middle way” natu-
ralism can in fact be said to be less crude than its predecessors, as well as how
it relates to the third direction to naturalism proposed by Bhaskar (1978, p.2),
in the form of “a qualified anti-positivist naturalism, based on an essentially re-
alist view of science”. By connecting ideas in Complexity Science to the work
of e.g. Roy Bhaskar, Mario Bunge, William Wimsatt, and David Lane, an al-
ternative philosophical foundation for a complexity science of societal systems
will be sketched, taking the form of an integrative and methodologically pluralist
“complex realism” (Reed and Harvey, 1992).
This essay takes the position that the question of naturalism is fundamentally
a question of ontology5, and to explore it, we will need uncover and examine
the ontological assumptions implicit in scientific practice. Bunge (1979a, p.15)
5“Ontology” is here understood as a specification of “the particular entities and processes pos-
tulated by some substantive scientific theory” (Bhaskar, 2013, p.30): an ontology describes what
are the entities in the world, their attributes and powers.
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argues that “Every theoretical view of society [...] has two components: an on-
tological and a methodological. The former concerns the nature of society, the
latter the way to study it.” Complexity Science brings both of these to the table
– meta-theory that speaks usefully to a social ontology and a toolkit of powerful
methods – but the latter goes in important ways in the opposite direction of the
former by being singularly focused on formalisms. Therefore, I join Elder-Vass
(2007c, p.228) in arguing that what is needed in the Complexity Science study of
society is a well-articulated social ontology that is open to revision, which would
also be conducive to the improvement of the methodology (which is not the same
as “the set of methods”).
The aim is thereby to cast light on the borderlands between the natural and so-
cial sciences with the purpose of developing a complexity-informed understand-
ing of the ontological distinctiveness of social systems, by attempting “to analyze
and to systematize the ontological categories” (Bunge, 1977b, p.12). This catego-
rization is performed on a plane spanned by dynamical and structural complexity
(Érdi, 2007), relating to Khalil’s (1995) separation between “artificiality” and
“individuality”. Based on this, the essay argues for “a turn to ontology” (Per-
ona, 2007) in Complexity Science’s study of society, by sketching a complexity
naturalism that does not invoke the reductionism of ontological individualism6.
This argument entails a degree of integration between the domains of the social
and natural sciences, in the sense that we may be able to apply similar onto-
logical frameworks to both – but not in the traditional reductionist or scientistic
sense (as Khalil 1995 notes, the ontological implications of using ecosystems as
a metaphor for society depends completely on how one views ecosystems). This
may in fact mean that the epistemological conclusions of this metaphor may not
be an ecology-inspired sociology, but just as well a sociology-inspired ecology.
The structure of this essay is as follows:
First, the exploration of the limits of complex naturalism begins with what
Bhaskar (1979) refers to as the ontological and epistemological conditions of the
social sciences, and specifically the question of openness7. This concept has been
6Following Khalil (1995), I will use “ontological individualism” rather than the more common
“methodological individualism”, due to the ambiguity of “methodology” in this context.
7“Open”/“Closed” are here used in the critical realist sense, which, it should be noted, is quite
different from the understanding in physics. Physics understands open systems as systems whose
borders are permeable to energy, and emphasizes that closed systems must eventually attain a time-
independent equilibrium state according to the second law of thermodynamics. This means that all
living systems are – by definition – open, as they maintain themselves by increasing the entropy
of their environment. The critical realist conception is instead of an analytical distinction, seeing a
gradient between open and closed, and focuses on the isolation between structural levels of the sys-
tems that are the prerequisite for regularities, rather than on the direct exchange of energy/matter
9seen as linked to complexity, but the linkage has been rather unclear: the social
scientific understanding of complexity tends to see openness as a categorical sub-
set to complexity, while the natural scientific approach tends to approach systems
as closed. This essay uses what in practice amounts to a comparative case study
between system categories to create a taxonomy of system ontologies, in which
the open/closed dichotomy and the simple/complex is split into a higher resolu-
tion plane, spanned by complicatedness (or “structural complexity”) on one side,
and complexity (or “dynamic complexity”) on the other. Following this, we look
closer at the primary category of systems relevant for the study of society. This
section leans on Paper I and Paper II.
Secondly, the essay focuses on how the complexity of societal systems plays
out in societies, in particular relating to what Bhaskar (1979) called the relational
condition of the social sciences. We focus on the dialectical relation between
agency and structure by looking at the historical evolution of human society and
the specifics of human cognition, bringing in notions of meaning and narrative
understanding. This leans on Paper III (as well as on work that is still to be
published, e.g. Törnberg and Andersson 2016)
Finally, this metatheoretical exposition is used as basis for a “turn to ontol-
ogy” (Perona, 2007) in the complexity approach to societal systems, suggesting
that while the complexity approach is certainly needed to study mass-dynamics in
societal systems, they need to be based in epistemology and methodology com-
patible with the real ontology of such systems. Urry (2003, 2005, 2012) has
famously argued that social science has experienced a “complexity-turn” – and
now it may be due time for Complexity Science to experience a corresponding
“society-turn”. This section leans on Paper IV and V, as well as on contributions
not included in this thesis (Andersson and Törnberg, 2016; Törnberg, 2016a,b).
(e.g. Danermark et al., 2001). This tends to be understood as to also include systems whose inter-
action with their environment is constant, stationary or orderly enough to allow fixed ontologies
to be assumed. This conception can perhaps, as in Reed and Harvey (1992, p.359), be referred to
as “ontological” – as opposed to “thermodynamical” – openness. See chapter 1 for more in-depth
definitions.
Chapter1
Epistemological & Ontological
Limits
1.1 Beyond the Open/Closed Dichotomy
A central separation between social and natural systems emphasized by philoso-
phers of science is that social systems tend to be more open than natural sys-
tems. Systems are considered closed if they are “cut off” and isolated from ex-
ternal influences, allowing them to operate under fixed conditions (e.g. Archer
et al., 2013; Bhaskar, 2013; Collier, 1994; Von Bertalanffy et al., 1950). Bhaskar
(2013) specifies two conditions for such closure: 1) The inner condition: no
qualitative change in the object under study; its internal mechanisms will stay the
same (Psillos, 2008); 2) The outer condition: the relationship between the causal
mechanisms and the mechanisms in their environment in which they act, have
to be constant (or at least stationary). This essentially means that the generative
mechanisms of phenomena operate independently from intervening mechanisms,
which leads to regularities in system dynamics.
Fleetwood (2016) attempts a definition of closure focusing on event-level
regularity, based on how the concept is used in e.g. Bhaskar (2013), Lawson
(1989, 2014) and Mearman (2006):
Parts of the social world characterised by (stochastic and/or proba-
bilistically specified) regularities between events or states of affairs
of the form ‘whenever event or state of affairs x then event or state
of affairs y’, are closed systems, and parts of this world not char-
acterised by such regularities are open systems. (Fleetwood, 2016,
p.1)
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Simon (1991) also looks at the open/closed dichotomy, but on the basis of sys-
tem structure, showing that closed systems can be described as “near-decomposable”
– the reason that they can be seen as “isolated” from external influences is that
they are separated into distinct organizational levels, and on those levels into dis-
tinct entities interacting through defined interfaces (see figure 1.1). Such levels
bring separations of timescales, ensuring that the ontology of the system level will
be relatively fixed during a relevant “short run” – a time scale that is long enough
for interesting dynamics to occur, but short enough for the assumptions about
the interfaces to remain valid. This is what allows one to study them as if they
were cut off from external influences; rigorous quantitative analysis becomes vi-
able because qualitative change happens on substantially longer time scales than
those of the analyses. Due to this difference in time scales, we can assume and
formulate a fixed ontology – a specification of the entities and the “rules of the
game” – and see how it plays out. The greater the separation of scales between
the internal and the external environment, the greater will the difference in size
and speed of the dynamics on these two levels be, and the more generous will
the short run be; i.e. the more interesting things will have time to happen. For
example, a suitable “short run” for the study of traffic would be between minutes
and hours. Over time scales shorter than minutes not much would happen – other
than the movement of the pistons and rods in the engines of the cars – and if we
move to several days, the dynamics would more or less repeat itself. Moving to
even longer time scales, roads, types of vehicles, regulations and so on would
begin to change.
In other words, what allows us to study these systems is that they have a
number of distinct levels. On closer inspection, we see that such systems can
be separated into two types, depending on the way that their levels emerge from
the underlying components. This is basically the fundamental insight of Com-
plexity Science: some systems are more like cars, others like flocks of birds (see
Mitchell (2009) for an overview of complexity; see Bajec and Heppner (2009)
for an overview on bird flock dynamics). In Paper I and II, we refer to the former
as complicated and the latter as complex, a separation that corresponds to Érdi’s
(2007) separation between “structural” and “dynamical” complexity.
As Paper I and II show, these system categories have distinctly different prox-
imal causes: complicated systems develop through orderly pre-determined spec-
ifications of assembly or morphogenesis (Slack, 2009), and are characterized by,
in general, having their distinct levels not through emergence1, but its opposite,
1This difficult notion will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 3, but its frequent ambiguity
warrants also more directly subscribing to a definition: as will be seen, I agree with Kaidesoja
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aggregativity (Wimsatt, 2007, p.274-276), of their underlying elements: a smaller
number of heterogeneous, functionally differentiated, adapted elements interact-
ing in a relatively ordered way. Complex systems tend to develop through self-
organization (Kauffman, 1993), and their structural levels form through emer-
gence, i.e. the mass-interaction of a large number of simple and homogeneous
entities (e.g. Goldstein, 1999). We will now look closer at these two categories
of near-decomposable systems.
Complicated systems are exemplified by technology2 and organisms: systems
organized in level hierarchies that may pack a very large numbers of components
into delineable compartments. This enables strongly simplified assumptions, as
it limits the permitted patterns of component interaction, and hence very little
knowledge about the surrounding system is needed to operate locally on its com-
ponents. Components are slaved by the larger system, meaning that they are fully
aligned, permitting adaptation into fine-tuned and non-redundant machineries:
this is what allows us to build spacecrafts with the capacity to land with high
precision on planets millions of kilometers away. These properties, in particu-
lar non-overlapping component functionality, also make them quite easy to study
and predict, since the mechanisms are naturally isolated to specific components,
and component interaction is simple. This means that we can reduce the system
over its interactions and break it down to its components. Its lack of dynamical
complexity is what allows us to make ceteris paribus assumptions, and isolate the
function of each component. In other words, we may usefully test our theories
through the use of controlled experiments3, which works exceedingly well on
such systems. Since each component is structured to perform certain functions,
reality can be captured in analogous abstractions biting over the entire system; the
use of what Hayles (1999), irreverently, calls the “Platonic backhand” is hence
quite reasonable for approaching such systems. Closed systems include the realm
that Khalil (1995) refers to as the “artificial”, and, as Byrne (2002) concludes,
(2009) that both Bhaskar’s and Bunge’s use of the term suffer from certain ambiguity and impre-
cision, and instead use Wimsatt’s (2007) understanding (quite compatible with both Bhaskar and
Bunge’s larger frameworks). Wimsatt (2007) defines emergence in negative terms, holding that
a given system property is emergent if it breaks one or more of the conditions of aggregativity,
implying a dependence on their mode of organization.
2E.g. any programmer will have intimate experience with attempting to construct complicated
systems: they are basically the goal of object-oriented design (Calero et al., 2006; Riel, 1996).
3This understanding of experiments also shows clearly why they should not be considered
“natural”, but that they are models, with built-in assumptions about the target systems. They are
virtual in the same sense as anything that is created for scientific use.
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this includes also mechanistic scientific models; in other words, our models can
in this case match the ontology of the system under study.
Complicated systems tend to display structural hierarchy, which links them to
perspectives that have experienced a revival in the analysis of biology (e.g. Hull,
1980; Koestler and Smythies, 1972; Weiss, 1971) and social theory (e.g. Miller,
1978; Williamson, 1975). What we mean by hierarchy here is not the idea of an
outside commander dictating the activity of the organization, but rather a nested
system, where components are embedded within other components in a level-
upon-level organization.
Complex systems are exemplified by herds, traffic, and social networks, and
are well-described by Morin’s (2008) “restricted complexity”: phenomena that
are the dynamically emergent product of interaction among a large number of
relatively simple agents from a few component classes (Johnson, 2002). The
emergence at play in such systems is specifically micro-emergence, in which the
interaction occurs between elements on the same ontological level, resulting in
macroscopic qualitative novelty (e.g. Bedau, 1997; Corning, 2002; Holland and
Wolf, 1998). Such emergence, and dynamical emergence in general, appears
“surprising” due to our inability to intuitively follow complex dynamics – long
chains of causation undermine our ability to predict outcomes.
Since mechanisms are not located in specific components, complex systems
are not characterized by precision, but rather by parallelism, adaptivity and feed-
back: this permits resilience over components – if one component breaks, others
can dynamically step into its place (Scheffer, 2009). This clearly constrains the
usefulness of experiments, and the Platonic backhand in general, since we cannot
isolate mechanisms to specific components. Dynamical complexity means that,
in a sense, mechanisms are complex and distributed within the interactions be-
tween the components rather than within single components: one does not find
the intelligence of the anthill in any specific ant (e.g. Dorigo and Stützle, 2009;
Wahde, 2008). In a sense, agency is all there is in complex systems, but it is a
highly limited agency, which only plays out locally. Due to this, complex systems
are much simpler than they may appear, at least given the tools to successfully
deal with emergence in systems with very large numbers of interacting entities.
Using simulation – Hayles’ (1999) “Platonic forehand” – we can test our theories
about system mechanisms by “growing” systems from models of the underly-
ing entities (Epstein, 1996). Since studying individual components tends to give
little clues, we are often forced to resolve to ad hoc assumptions regarding the
behavior of these components. While this is a risky game, since such systems
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are characterized by both equifinality (a phenomenon may rise from radically
different conditions) and multifinality (similar conditions may result in very dif-
ferent outcomes), it is made possible by the simplicity of the components. In
other words, in the same way that we can reduce complicated systems over their
dynamical simplicity, we can reduce complex systems over their structural sim-
plicity. Even so, since complex systems are generally characterized by chaos –
the flip-side of the resilience coin – and an inherent lack of precision, we cannot
predict their future states, but only their general dynamics (e.g. Cvitanovic et al.,
2005, p.146–149).
Figure 1.1: A near-decomposable system, conceptually illustrated in two ways. Because
of time scale separation, the outer environment can be regarded as static, and the inner
can be similarly disregarded.
Figure 1.2: An attempt to illustrate a poorly decomposable system. Because of lack of
clear system demarcations and time scale separation, it can be unclear what outer and
inner environment would even mean.
Non-Decomposable Systems
As we have seen, our study of complicated systems relies on the assumption that
they are dynamically simple, and our study of complex systems on that they are
structurally simple. However, Paper I shows, there is no reason to assume that a
system cannot display both complexity and complicatedness, which hence would
mean that we cannot reduce it over either axis. This perspective, of viewing com-
plexity and complicatedness as two separate system properties, allows us span
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a plane of system types, permitting a systematic categorization of ontologies in
which both closed and open systems are represented, and in which open systems
combine complexity and complicatedness (see figure 1.3.)
While complex and complicated systems differ in some important ways, they
also share some similarities. A crucial similarity is that they are both structured
into nested hierarchies, with each level forming the building blocks for the next,
which is what allows the systems to be reduced downward into distinguishable
subsystems (Simon, 1991). One important reason that systems can become de-
composable is when they are what Khalil (1995) refers to as “artificial”: they lack
individuality of their own as they are fabricated, either through natural selection
or by the hands of purposive agents, to fulfill a purpose. William Wimsatt’s (e.g.
1986) concept of “generative entrenchment” shows how such selection will result
in structured systems, where each level functions as an alphabet for generating
the next, as this is the most adaptive and flexible system structure. This is also
described by what in assemblage theory is called “coding” (DeLanda, 2006).
The components of open systems, on the other hand, are not completely arti-
ficial, but have at least some level of individuality. This means that, since there
is no higher functionality of the system, and mechanisms therefore cannot be
linked to a function, the generative mechanisms will not be located exclusively in
neither relations or in components. This in turn implies that the messy real can-
not be reduced to an abstract form, since such a form would require a functional
ideal: hence, the Platonic backhand will not work, since their mechanisms are
not located into specific components; the Platonic forehand will not work since
their components are too complicated to be ad hoc deduced. They hence become
non-decomposable, and there is, in the general case, no separation between time
scales: anything may interact with anything, and a modification may therefore
impact any part of the system. This means that invariant empirical regularities do
not obtain, and open systems are therefore denied decisive test situations for their
theories; ceteris paribus can never be assumed (Bhaskar, 1979).
Just as with closed systems, we can distinguish a number of different types of
open systems based on their level of dynamical and structural complexity, again
stemming from different developmental histories: trans-complicated, trans-complex,
sub-wicked and wicked systems (see Figure 1.3 and Paper II).
Trans-complicated systems are complicated organizations of components with
separate agendas, exemplified by organizations with human components, or bio-
logical individuals (e.g. of different species) with separate channels of reproduc-
tion. Complexity enters as an increased density, and lower regularity, of interac-
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Figure 1.3: A map over the ontological categories, as spanned by dynamical and struc-
tural complexity. See Paper II.
tions: for example, while an exhaust manifold is precisely an exhaust manifold,
a human component will connect a system to just about all sectors of society and
in a wide variety of ways (a seamless web; Hughes 1986.) These systems do
have some collective functionality, but also some level of internal competition
between components, which tends to break down the level hierarchy. System
alignment must be actively maintained by dedicated systems, which is costly and
carries the risk of failure. Failure, i.e. components adapting to their own aims
and goals at the expense of the whole (i.e. “defecting” in game theoretic terms),
can go from having detrimental effects on system structure, to being exceedingly
dangerous for the system. For example, when cells begin to compete with other
cells within an organism, racing toward becoming the fittest unicellular pheno-
type within this selection environment – i.e. the cancer cell – this typically spells
the end of both the organism and the cell germ-line, as their only long-term means
of reproduction remains the holistic system (although there are fascinating exam-
ples of cancer evolving transmissibility, hence leaving the selection-pressure of
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the holistic system altogether, e.g. Pearse and Swift 2006, as well as immune re-
sponses evolved to combat this transmissibility, see Alderton 2016 – an example
which highlights the quasi-porous boundaries between inside/outside systems, as
well as between system levels; see below.)
The trans-complicated nature of organizations can be clearly seen in the ten-
sion between organizational and occupational perspectives in the study of be-
havior in organizations (see Orr, 1996; Van Maanen and Barley, 1982): while
the former tends to describe a functional machinery with limited patterns of
interaction between parts, the latter emphasizes informal story-telling and in-
teractions cutting through organizational compartments. There is clearly also
a broad spectrum of organizational forms, between the strict hierarchical mili-
tary organization – close to Weber’s (2009) ideal bureaucracy – to loosely or-
ganized open source groups, characterized by sub-wickedness (see below) rather
than trans-complicatedness. These organizational forms afford different strengths
and weaknesses: the former a high level of precision, predictability and stability,
while the latter permits high levels of innovation and adaptability. Some process
frameworks, such as Scrum, explicitly aim for self-organization, in some ways
mimicking hunter-gatherer groups (Dingsøyr et al., 2012), by institutionalizing
sub-wickedness through e.g. story exchange (Martin, 2003).
Trans-complex systems represent the harnessing of affordances of complex sys-
tems by adding elements of persistent complicated organization to complex sys-
tems, exemplified by various systems in the “sharing economy” (e.g. AirBnB,
Uber, see e.g. Hamari et al. 2015), smart grids (see e.g. Clastres, 2011), so-
cial media movements (e.g. Anonymous, see e.g. Beraldo 2016), and terrorist
networks (e.g. Bohorquez et al., 2009). If the epitomizing example for com-
plex systems is flocks, the corresponding for trans-complex systems is an orga-
nized herd: the self-organization of the system is put under a simple scaffolding
structure to align and direct it toward some central goal (Wimsatt and Griese-
mer, 2007). In other words, these are often loosely organized groups based on
disseminated designs, shared views, and norms for alignment, rather than direct
top-down control. By optimizing either structural features of the interaction be-
tween components (as in social media) or of the components themselves (as in
selection-induced morphological change of animal behavior in literal herding, see
e.g. Marshall and Weissbrod 2011), a level of structural complexity is induced.
Non-decomposability develops specifically in the interaction between structural
change and dynamical emergence in these systems (see also Lane, 2016).
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Sub-wicked systems are wicked systems that are small enough to fit into the
range of human cognition, and that have not outgrown our capacity to design or
govern them. In other words, what delimits sub-wicked from wicked is the limits
of human comprehension, which is, however, highly relevant in the methodologi-
cal context. Sub-wicked systems can be exemplified by local social contexts such
as families or workplaces, and early human societies. If societal systems – the
realm of human politics – are wicked, then social systems – the realm of everyday
human, and certain other mammal, interaction – are sub-wicked4.
Sub-wicked systems exhibit wicked problems: they are recalcitrant to formal
methods, but they are small enough for us to handle cognitively. It is no coin-
cidence that we possess the capacity to do so: we are adapted specifically for
dealing with sub-wicked systems, as human intelligence developed in, and per-
haps even in response to, exactly such a context (e.g. Read, 2012; Tomasello et al.,
2012; Van der Waal, 1982). The nature of wickedness is captured by the feed-
back interaction between emergence and the patterns resulting from that emer-
gence, as individuals are capable of not only adapting to other individuals, but
also to patterns emerging from precisely this interaction – what Goldspink and
Kay (2007) call “reflexive emergence”. Hence, acting demands the ability to deal
with constant social innovation: intrigues, new constellations, secrets, lies, and
the relations between others and between others and oneself (Read, 2012).
In human groups, the primary mean of dealing with this is the narrative,
which is simultaneously a way of theorizing behavior, exchanging meaning, and
structuring community, i.e. just like the interaction modalities of social platforms
shape online communities, narrative is a naturally evolved interaction modality
that constrains and shapes social communities (c.f. e.g. Brown and Duguid, 1991;
Orr, 1996). Narrative thinking provides “the genetically transmitted possibili-
ties for interaction, resulting in relations and patterns, provide the framework in
which the single individuals can realize their specific behavior and thereby jointly
create the group-specific social structure.” (Hendrichs, 1983, p.739). Narratives
are not only evolved to allow negotiation between the interests of individual ac-
tors and the collective, but are also a form of reasoning native to sub-wicked
systems, as they embody an understanding of interaction of adapting systems:
4This separation between social and societal/political existed in Greek understanding, and res-
onates with Hannah Arendt’s thinking: “This special relationship between action and being to-
gether seems fully to justify the early translation of Aristotle’s zo¯on politikon by animal socialis,
already found in Seneca, which then became the standard translation through Thomas Aquinas:
homo est naturaliter politicus, id est, socialis (“man is by nature political, that is, social”). More
than any elaborate theory, this unconscious substitution of the social for the political betrays the
extent to which the original Greek understanding of politics had been lost.” (Arendt, 1958, p.39)
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narratives are capable of handling a number of key characteristics of sub-wicked
systems such as heterogeneity, contingency and a multilevel nature (Richardson,
1990).
The resulting structure that forms from the interactions between such indi-
viduals are, like complex systems, robust in that, within limits, individuals and
behavior are exchangeable without altering the social order (Hendrich 1983).
Hence, the social order has a reality of its own which acts on individuals and
their behavior. The structures preexist individuals, and form them to a greater
extent than to which the structure is changed by their specific individuality (Hen-
drichs, 1983). As Khalil (1995) puts it, the organization of groups of humans or
of her close relatives5
is not an artificial entity or a vehicle used by organisms for precon-
stituted strategies. Rather, the organization is an individual with its
own distinctive traits which are passed from one generation to the
next through learning. This sort of individual influences the behav-
ior of its members concerning rank, attachments, friendly relations,
role divisions, and profiles. (Khalil, 1995, p.410)
An important glue of these social entities is what Tuomela (2007, p.338) calls
“we-mode thinking and acting”: the members think and act for the group’s use
and benefit. This makes it difficult to deny them status as “social agents in a
genuine sense” (Niiniluoto, 2007, p.419), even with rather restrictive definitions
of agenthood (e.g. Sibeon, 2004). These entities cannot only be regarded as “so-
cial”, “organizational” or “collective” actors (Mouzelis, 1991; Sibeon, 2004), but
should also be seen as being endowed with agential causal powers (Pettit, 2009).
That emergent structures in these systems should hence be considered real, is
what results in the particular relationship between part and whole that is charac-
teristic of open systems in general, and wicked systems in particular (see Gold-
spink and Kay, 2007). This relationship is in practice a dialectical one, as Levins
and Lewontin (1985) put it:
“Part” and “whole” have a special relationship to each other, in that
one cannot exist without the other, any more than “up” can exist
without “down.” What constitutes the parts is defined by the whole
that is being considered. Moreover, parts acquire properties by virtue
of being parts of a particular whole, properties they do not have in
5Khalil instead refers to the broader group of “mammals” here, however, this is no longer
believed to be the case – see Read (2012).
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isolation or as parts of another whole. It is not that the whole is more
than the sum of its parts, but that the parts acquire new properties.
But as the parts acquire properties by being together, they impart to
the whole new properties, which are reflected in changes in the parts,
and so on. Parts and whole evolve in consequence of their relation-
ship, and the relationship itself evolves. These are the properties of
things that we call dialectical: that one thing cannot exist without the
other, that one acquires its properties from its relation to the other,
that the properties of both evolve as a consequence of their interpen-
etration. (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p.3)
As Fuchs (2007, p.18) argues, this interpretation of emergence amounts to
“a reformulation of dialectical philosophy,” despite the lack of explicit acknowl-
edgement of the “dialectical tradition and heritage of the philosophy of nature in
the line of Friedrich Engels” and Hegel (Fuchs, 2003, p.74) (one exception to this
is Carneiro’s (2000) wonderful study of the transformation of quantity into qual-
ity, providing a complexity-perspective on the law stipulated by Hegel (Bukharin,
1925) and studied by Marx and Engels in Anti-Dühring and Dialektik der Natur.)
The capacity for the component to adapt to the whole means that events and
acts play out on multiple levels, and that the boundaries dividing different levels
are quasi-porous: there is, for example, no biological phenomenon whose causes
and consequences play out in only one context. Hendrichs (1983) provides an
example of this multi-levelness:
When performing their defecation ceremony at a specific place on
the boundary of its territory, dik diks do at least five things at once:
they excrete urine and dung; they mark their territorial boundary with
optical and olfactory signals; they claim their territorial ownership
up to that point; they strengthen their attachment to that place; they
strengthen the integration of their group. (Hendrichs, 1983, p.741)
This interconnection between levels is also expressed in that sub-wicked sys-
tems have two types of emergence, while complex systems display only one.
Complex systems display what Gilbert (2002) calls “first order emergence”; in
which interactions among individual components result in a whole. Subwicked
systems also display what Gilbert (2002) calls “second order emergence” and
what Goldspink and Kay (2007) call “reflexive emergence”, where the compo-
nents are able to recognize and adapt to the emergent products of their own in-
teraction, resulting in “the amazing variety and mutability of social [and societal]
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systems” (Bunge, 1998, p.8). This implies that we may also consider some emer-
gent structures as having capacity for agency, again illustrating the reality and
capacity for agency of structures in such systems.
“Wicked systems6” is a reference to Rittel and Webber’s (1973) term “wicked
problems”, which describes a class of problems that are characterized by a set
of epistemological griefs; e.g. that they lack definitive formulations, that it is
unclear when and if we are finished solving them, that they are caused by – and
are the causes of – many other similar problems, and that they require uniquely
tailored solutions. The reference implies that this is in fact not only a description
of isolated problems as such, but that it captures something fundamental about
the nature of the systems that generate such problems.
Wicked systems are arenas of and for innovation, with their constituents
constantly trying to outsmart one-another, reaping their own benefits, reacting
to threats from other constituents, as exemplified by large human societies and
ecosystems over evolutionary time. This produces a situation where complicated
organization and complex dynamics are in a constant state of re-negotiation, con-
stantly challenging any settlement of the system into a level hierarchy, constantly
facing the system with qualitative novelty that other components have to react to.
This has two immediate results. First, the dynamics of wicked systems cannot be
understood in terms of functions, but rather as emergent externalities from under-
lying component interaction. Secondly, qualitative change, i.e. change in kind,
6The question may here arise whether wicked systems are in fact “systems” at all, if they fulfill
no functionalities and have unclear boundaries. Cambridge Dictionary defines “system” as “a set
of connected things or devices that operate together”. Oxford English Dictionary defines it as: “1.
An organized or connected group of things. 2. The whole scheme of created things, the universe.
3a. A group or set of related or associated things perceived or thought of as a unity or complex
whole. 3b. A set of persons working together as parts of an interconnecting network.” etc. These
definitions clearly cover wicked systems as well, as they are often “perceived or thought of as a
unity of complex whole” and they do consist of “connected things or devices that operate together”
(at least in the broader sense of “together”.) This seems to imply that wicked systems indeed fulfill
the dictionary definition of the term (one might object that the often ill-defined boundaries of their
components challenge – or at least make problematically recursive – definition 1, but in any case
it is clear that they are commonly “perceived or thought of as a unity or complex whole”.) So far
so good. However, there is a second line of criticism against the term, basically arguing that the
concept “system” itself is associated to what we call “complicatedness”; as Jenkins (2010, p.142)
argues, “notions of system may encourage us to tell the wrong story about humans”. Bunge (1999,
p.5) responds to this with that: “trying to avoid the word ‘system’ just because of its association
with Parsons or Luhmann is like boycotting the word ‘nation’ only it is abused by nationalists.”
While I remain unconvinced about the ultimate usefulness of nations, I do find that using “system”
is both legitimate and indispensable. That being said, it should also be noted that what I mean by
“system” in this context also resonates strongly with Delanda’s (2006) notion of “assemblage”.
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related to what Archer (e.g. 2013a,b) calls morphogenesis, is the modus operandi
of wicked systems, and to disregard it in their study “signifies nothing less than
the wilful obliteration of [the] very subject matter” (Arendt, 1958, p.57).
It is the innovation of underlying actors that upsets any level hierarchical
organization, thereby ruining prospects for near-decomposability, by constantly
rewriting the “rules of the game”. As Wicked systems are non-decomposable,
short runs (see section 1.1) are not just hard to find, there is no guarantee that
there even exists a meaningful short run – wicked systems may in fact be seen
as systems that largely lack relevant short runs and thereby also opportunities for
powerful formal modeling. Levels of organization have been described as “stable
foci of regularity and predictability”, and as such, the existence of levels of orga-
nization in itself must be expected to act as attractors to adaptive processes: they
should self-reinforce and self-stabilize over time (Wimsatt, 1994) since adapt-
ing systems evolve in such a way as to minimize uncertainty in their environment
(Levins, 1968). However, as Wimsatt (1994) points out, this is only half the story.
In a competitive situation, i.e. a situation with what Khalil (1995) calls individ-
uality, entities under competition (be they organisms, organizations or humans)
will themselves seek to be as unpredictable as possible to their competitors, which
would make it adaptive to also break up level hierarchies.
Wimsatt (1975, p.181–185) furthermore argues that Simon’s principles take
only ease of design and assembly into account, not optimality of function. Opti-
mality of function, of course, may be under strong selection pressure, and when it
is we should expect this to cause breakdowns in level-hierarchical organization.
The reason is that there is no convincing argument for why a style of organiza-
tion that simplifies assembly and design would also make for optimal function.
Intuitively this expectation seems to be carried out in reality. Technological ar-
tifacts that are mass-produced (strong pressure for adaptability, cheap assembly
and easy maintenance) contain more standard components, and are simpler in
their architecture, than ones that are highly specialized and produced only in very
few numbers.
The wickedness of human communities developed from an initial sub-wicked
organization of great ape foraging groups and communities (Grove et al., 2012).
Through the development of increasingly tight and multifaceted cooperation
(Tomasello et al., 2012), early hominin (after the concestor7) communities may
have begun to accumulate the physiological and cultural affordances necessary
7The concestor refers to the last common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees (Dawkins and
Wong, 2005). The nature of the concestor can be inferred from strong similarity in lifestyle and
morphology between fossil great apes (Wrangham and Pilbeam, 2002) from the relevant time space
5-7 million years ago (Kumar et al., 2005).
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to transition from social/sub-wicked to societal/wicked, through the “seamless”
(Hughes, 1986) integration between the social and technical, transforming, even-
tually, the emerging human community into a larger interconnected sociotechni-
cal system (Geels, 2004). Technology here functioned simultaneously as pow-
erful modes of interaction between actors, while also themselves being inter-
actors (Hull, 1988). Due to the complicated and near-decomposable structure
of technology, technological artifacts can maintain vast and heterogeneous ar-
rays of interaction and thereby integrate cultural systems by tying its various
domains together. Hence, through such socio-technological structures, human
culture became capable of maintaining interaction systems where every node is
densely connected to just about all domains of the web. The seamless web –
which is barely but importantly discernible in chimpanzees technology-assisted
extractive foraging (e.g. Biro et al., 2003) and “politics” (Van der Waal, 1982)
– was thereby simultaneously integrated through weakly constrained interaction,
and separated, through specialization. This is a procedural recipe for full-scale
wickedness.
Interactions in these seamless webs have a strong enveloping competitive
component but display also the whole spectrum of ecological interactions (com-
petition, symbiosis, neutralism, parasitism, commensalism and amensalism; see
Sandén and Hillman 2011, p.407). Symbiotic interactions may give rise to self-
organized systems toward the trans-complicated and trans-complex regimes; e.g.
bundles of value chains as described by Sandén and Hillman (2011, p.404-406).
Parts and levels may over time co-adapt to become increasingly co-dependent;
compare with examples of symbiotic origins of complicated systems (see Leigh,
2010; Roze and Michod, 2001). The boundary between wickedness and trans-
qualities is thereby porous.
Components act and react within neighborhoods in the seamless web, and,
since each is part of many neighborhoods, change is liable to propagate across
the system. Dynamically and macroscopically, this leads to two dialectical dy-
namical regimes: transition and lock-in. Transitions are self-propagating waves
of qualitative “reconfigurations” of and by components, traveling across neigh-
borhoods in the seamless web (Geels, 2002; Lane and Maxfield, 1997). These
may form potentially system-wide cascades of change (Geels, 2011; Lane, 2011a;
Lane et al., 2009b; Schiffer, 2005). However, if locally beneficial reconfigura-
tions cannot be made, change will be resisted, and if such criteria, posed by large
numbers of strongly interconnected components, are combined, the range of ac-
tually viable innovations will be strongly constrained and channeled. The result
is a lock-in, such as by a dominant design (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975) or a
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sociotechnical regime (Geels, 2002; Rip and Kemp, 1998). The combined effects
of cascades and entrenchment of effects is a potentially unlimited horizon in time
and scope for consequences of actions.
Due to the strong and heterogeneous connections that crisscross wicked sys-
tems, it is impossible to divide such systems them into realistic pictures: only the
full system is enough to represent the system, and that will never be theoretically
achievable (see also Cilliers, 1998, 2002). Any “picture” captured will neces-
sarily be from a perspective, and rarely subject to universal agreement. Even if
we could obtain a “realistic picture”, this would frequently not help much since
the system changes unpredictably over time – including as a direct result of us
interacting with it.
Since there is no axis of reduction, there is no native method fit to fully cover
wicked systems, and hence, as Paper I discusses, the attempts to formally deal
with wicked systems have generally focused on treating them either as complex or
complicated systems – “the reductionist and the functionalist approaches extend
the tool found successful in one domain to decipher the other” (Khalil, 1995,
p.414-415) – neither of which matches their ontological nature and neither of
which can be said to have been very successful. They are, in Archer’s (1996)
terminology, conflating the systems either downward or upward.
In the context of social theory, the former – ontologically individualist reduc-
tionism – relates to what Gilje and Grimen (1992) call the action paradigm, in
which actors are viewed as free agents whose interaction leads to varying types
of phenomena. In this view, structures and systems are merely relatively sta-
ble patterns, either emerging from or simply constituted by aggregated individual
action. In relation to social meta-theories, this implies treating society as ontolog-
ically flat, as – to a certain extent – in assemblage theory and analytical sociology
(DeLanda, 2006; Hedström, 2005) (see chapter 3).
Action paradigm Fact paradigm
Primacy: Bottom-up Top-down
Complexity: Dynamical (complex) Structured (complicated)
Ontology: Individualism Holism
The latter – ontologically holistic reductionism – relates to functionalism,
and more broadly to what Gilje and Grimen (1992) call the fact paradigm, i.e.
in which social facts are the primary object of study: institutions, social struc-
tures, organizations etc. The term “social structure” is used in a strong way,
while “agency” is used weakly, i.e. as simply ways in which structures are repro-
duced. This encapsulates methodologically holistic (e.g. social fabric matrix, see
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Hayden 1982, and institutional dynamics, see Radzicki 1988), functionalist and
system-focused approaches, as well as Luhmann’s (1986; 1995) system theory (as
Wan (2011) convincingly argues), and is traditionally understood (e.g. by Daner-
mark et al. 1997) to have Èmile Durkheim8 as its early proponent. (It can also be
seen rather explicitly represented in Mumford’s (1966) concept “mega-machine”,
in which society is seen as an “archetypal machine composed of human parts”.)
Hence, from a social theory standpoint, the combination between complexity
and complicatedness is linked to the meeting between the fact paradigm and the
action paradigm, between agency and structure, a meeting whose resulting ontol-
ogy is either “dualist” (as Giddens, 1984) or a “dualism” (as Archer, 2000). (The
resulting implications of wicked systems on the view of social structures will be
discussed in Chapter 3.) The intuitive, but non-formalized, alternative to these
two directions, is to cast wicked systems into the realm of subwickedness by us-
ing narratives as the methodology. This is an attractive option since it matches
the ontology of wicked systems (as we will see in Chapter 2). That narratives
are compatible with the combination of complicatedness and complexity does,
however, not mean that they are very capable of dealing with either – indeed, this
is why such systems are perceived as overwhelming to begin with.
1.2 Uncertainty in Wicked Systems
As we have seen, complicated systems permit exact prediction, while complex
systems are more uncertain: due to nonlinearity, one may only predict their gen-
eral dynamics, rather than specific states. Wicked systems are defined by an even
deeper level of uncertainty, which lies at the core of what dealing with wicked-
ness is about: both prediction of future states, and of future dynamics rely on the
possibility of decoupling “the game” from “the rules of the game”. But in wicked
systems, the game and its rules frequently change dynamically on similar time
scales: qualitative – and, from the perspective of decomposition, ontological –
change is occurring on the same time-scales as quantitative change.
This means that wicked systems are less like a game in which defined entities
play according to set rules, and more like a boiling pot of change where each
discernible shape and structure, resulting from the interplay of a variety of coun-
teracting forces, may very well dissolve as quickly as they evolve. Yet, entity
8Boudon (1981, p.155) however refers to this view as a result of a “superficial reading of
Durkheim”, that has given rise to “the myth of Durkheimian holism” (Cherkaoui et al., 2008,
p.18). Durkheim’s empirical analyses are in fact “much richer, subtler and promising” than this
would suggest (Cherkaoui et al., 2008, p.39).
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interaction, game-play and gradual quantitative change are ubiquitous, as many
stuctures display surprising persistence, but this may just as soon be replaced by
rapid fundamental transitions and rapid qualitative change, as quantitative change
becomes qualitative (Carneiro, 2000).
This perspective on level of near-decomposability of different system do-
mains gives a new perspective on the separation between static ontologies, char-
acterized by the belief that “change is only a momentary departure from equilib-
rium or harmony, which would be the ideal state of affairs” (Bunge, 2011, p.20),
and dynamic ontology, in which the central thesis is that “statis is a particular and
ephemeral case of process: that every state of a thing is either the initial, interme-
diary or final phase of a process” (Bunge, 2011, p.20). The latter is exemplified
by Emirbayer’s (1997) relational sociology:
Sociologists today are faced with a fundamental dilemma: whether
to conceive of the social world as consisting primarily in substances
or in processes, in static ‘things’ or in dynamic, unfolding relations.
Large segments of the sociological community continue implicitly
or explicitly to prefer the former point of view. Rational-actor and
norm-based models, diverse holisms and structuralisms, and statis-
tical ‘variable’ analyses – all of the beholden to the idea that it is
entities that come first and relations among them only subsequently
– hold sway throughout much of the discipline. But increasingly,
researchers are searching for viable analytic alternatives, approaches
that reverse these basic assumptions and depict social reality instead
in dynamic, continuous, and processual terms. (Emirbayer, 1997,
p.281)
This separation is not as much a binary dichotomy as a gradual scale; Bunge
(2001, p.32-33) distinguishes (in a somewhat biased terminology) between “rad-
ical” and “moderate” dynamicism, where the former invokes the full phanta rhei
of Heraclitus, and sees the world as constituted by processes or events rather
than entities, while the latter admits that “some traits remain invariant throughout
certain changes” (Bunge, 1977c, p.279) and that change is sometimes enabled
exactly by this permanence.
The position on this scale is not only defined by the system category, but can
also vary over time. For example, the ontological stability of society is rooted
primarily in the stability of material culture, and ontological change is driven
primarily by innovation and changes in the material base (see e.g Archer, 2014;
Bauman, 2013; Danermark et al., 1997; Elder-Vass, 2017). Hence, as the power
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relation between these two factors change, as material culture becomes more liq-
uid, not least due to digitalization, human society becomes more prone to qual-
itative change – in other words moving toward a more dynamic ontology (see
Törnberg, 2016a).
Dynamics of qualitative change is exceptionally difficult to study, even com-
pared to complex and chaotic systems. For example, the stock-market, while
infamous for its unpredictability, is only quantitatively chaotic: on the relevant
time-scale, it is ontologically fixed, and hence, it is only chaotic in relation to its
state, not its kind (Byrne and Callaghan, 2013). The unpredictability of the stock-
market is an example of what we can call “second order chaos”, in reference
to Gilbert’s (2002) “second order emergence”: if predictable patterns emerge,
they will be discovered and undermined by constituent agents. Conversely, in
wicked systems, the capacity of agents to detect emergent structures allows such
second-order chaos to take a qualitative form (what could be rightly described as
“ontological chaos”.)
Because of this, consequences of action in wicked systems is shrouded in
deep uncertainty, described by Lane and Maxfield (2005) as an “ontological un-
certainty”: not about the truth of well-defined propositions (“truth uncertainty”),
nor about the meaning of a given statement (“semantic uncertainty”), but about
what entities that inhabit the world, how they may interact, and how interactions
and entities change through interaction (Bonifati, 2010). Uncertainty keeps us
from aligning action to respond to future ill effects (game theory; e.g. Gintis
2000; Ostrom 1990), but it also prevents us from designing effective interven-
tions without high likelihoods of causing unexpected troubles in other domains.
Clearly, however, there are many important cases where we can surely make
assumptions of near-decomposability also in wicked systems, and where we thus
are able to bring powerful scientific approaches to bear. For the purposes of
complexity science, it would seem reasonable that certain subsystems - such as
crowd behavior, protein-folding, or the ceteris paribus fate of a new trait in a
population - can be argued to fit this description. The dynamics of cars and
people play themselves out over much shorter time scales than that on which
urban systems, roads, traffic regulation and so on, change. Such phenomena are
also often ephemeral, which bounds the problem even further. For example, at
night the traffic jam dissipates and leaves no traces that affect tomorrow’s traffic.
But what about evolutionary societal and ecological phenomena more in gen-
eral? For example, what about sociotechnical transitions, evolutionary radiation
events, or other wicked problems? Wicked systems in general are open systems,
in which many and far-flung types of processes co-exist, co-evolve and have an
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impact on each other on overlapping timescales and levels of organization. They
involve discontinuous, qualitative change as well as cascade effects (Lane, 2011a)
whereby change strongly and rapidly feeds back into the conditions for further
change. Such systems are, to say the least, hard to contain in a Simonean com-
partment with a “short run” over which, for example, transitions can be studied
against the background of an unchanging external environment.
Put in another way, the type of hierarchy that micro-emergence assumes does
matter in wicked systems, as Bickhard (2000, p.326) argues, “emergence presup-
poses a notion of levels”, but neither causality nor structure is restricted to the
hierarchies: we have interpenetration and overlaps, as well as multi-directional
causality. It is not only that “an n:th level system is composed of things on level
n-1” (Bunge, 2004b, p.133), but it may also include elements from any other lev-
els. Simon (1991) was of course aware of the existence of such interpenetrations,
but nevertheless, assumed that there was enough hierarchical structure to make
modeling possible, and thus emphasized that which falls within the hierarchies,
proposing that hierarchical models provide an adequate approximation (in line
with the spirit of the time). In complex and complicated systems, such interpen-
etrations are indeed exceptions, but in wicked systems they are instead the norm.
More figuratively speaking, if complicated and complex systems are like onions,
where you can neatly peel each layer from the next with only some thin slimy
strings connecting the two, wicked systems are more like a mango: any attempt
at separating them into levels, or in fact even trying to peel them, will most likely
result in a gooey – but delicious – mess.
1.3 Boundaries of Wicked Systems
Due to the high level of interconnection and dynamic complexity in wicked sys-
tems, it tends to be difficult to define system boundaries. Decomposable systems
generally have clear defined boundaries, and in turn consist of distinguishable en-
tities. For example, the birds in a flock might interact in complex ways leading to
unpredictable emergent dynamics, but at least the birds themselves can be distin-
guished as clearly defined, separate entities that are unlikely to evolve during the
time-scale of the flock. This is often not the case in wicked systems. As Cilliers
(2001) puts it, what we call wicked systems
have structure, embodied in the patterns of interactions between the
components. Some of these structures can be stable and long lived
[...], whilst others can be volatile and ephemeral. These structures
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are also intertwined in a complex way. We find structure on all
scales. [...] [N]on-contiguous sub-systems could be part of many
different systems simultaneously. This would mean that different
systems interpenetrate each other, that they share internal organs.
How does one talk of the boundary of the system under these condi-
tions? (Cilliers, 2001, p.4-6)
Furthermore, since ideas of spatial continuity do not apply to these systems,
one of the foundations on which we traditionally base the notion of boundaries is
turned on its head. As Cilliers (2001) puts it:
We often fall into the trap of thinking of a boundary as something
that separates one thing from another. We should rather think of a
boundary as something that constitutes that which is bounded. This
shift will help us to see the boundary as something enabling, rather
than as confining. [...] [An] implication of letting go of a spatial
understanding of boundaries would be that in a critically organised
system we are never far away from the boundary. If the components
of the system are richly interconnected, there will always be a short
route from any component to the “outside” of the system. There is
thus no safe “inside” of the system, the boundary is folded in, or per-
haps, the system consists of boundaries only. Everything is always
interacting and interfacing with others and with the environment; the
notions of “inside” and “outside” are never simple or uncontested.9
(Cilliers, 2001, p.5)
So not only are wicked systems under constant ongoing ontological change,
but their boundaries are far from as clear as positivist science tends to imagine
them. In wicked systems, entity interaction – on and between all levels – is
ubiquitous and central to the dynamics of the system. But since there are also
relations with the surrounding environment, it is generally not obvious where
the boundaries are to be drawn. It is more of a question of framing: we frame
the system by describing it, but reality constrains where the frame can be drawn
(Cilliers, 1998, 2001). The boundary is neither only a construction nor only a
natural thing – it is a mix and an ongoing interaction between these (Richardson
and Lissack, 2001).
9It is interesting to note that the dominance of boundaries can in fact be said to be a general fact
of high-dimensional systems. To see this, consider the ratio between surface area Sn and volume
Vn for a n-dimensional hypercube: SnVn =
2nrn−1
rn =
2n
r , now clearly as limn→∞
Sn
Vn = ∞.
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This clearly has implications for how to approach wicked systems scientif-
ically. While complex systems require radically new scientific methodologies
to deal with the intricacies of relational reduction, the poor decomposability of
wicked systems calls for something far more radical still (Castellani and Hafferty,
2009). The constant ontological transformation clearly implies a weaker type of
knowledge claims, and Cilliers (1998; 2001) accordingly suggests a significantly
less universal conception of scientific knowledge: as contextual, local and spe-
cific in time and space. This may sound postmodernist in a negative sense, but
there is a significant difference between this and full-blown relativism. That the
possibilities for prediction and description are limited does not mean that any-
thing goes, as the most radical postmodernist theorists could lead us to believe;
the world can be known, even if that knowledge is contextual and time limited.
While this has implications for positivism, it in no way downplays the impor-
tance of scientific work. Quite the opposite: that our knowledge of a system is
only local and temporary emphasizes the importance of knowing how to learn
about a system (Byrne and Callaghan, 2013). It however affects how to scien-
tifically relate to the systems under study, as Actor-Network theorist Law (2004,
p.7) puts it: “... in this way of thinking the world is not a structure, something
that we can map with our social science charts. We might think of it, instead, as
a maelstrom or a tide rip. Imagine that it is filled with currents, eddies, flows,
vortices, unpredictable changes, storms, and with moments of lull and calm”.
But our scientific knowledge will not only be contextual and time-limited:
because of the constant ontological transformation we have no stable ground to
stand on required for a reduction of the system; if we are to be sure that the
dynamics of the system is the same, we cannot represent a complex system with
anything less complicated than itself (Cilliers, 2001). Since simplifications are
of course necessary for any meaningful scientific work, this basically means that
any representation will necessarily be flawed, and we cannot even know in which
way it is flawed.
In wicked systems involving humans, the question of framing and system
boundaries is decidedly at its hardest. In such systems, the choice of framing
will not only be a scientific question, but an ethical question, as the choice will
necessarily affect the reality of the system (Byrne and Callaghan, 2013; Cilliers,
2000): constructing a boundary for a system can mean that this boundary be-
comes more present in the system; temporary structures may gain longevity by
being described. This is part of what Bhaskar (1979) calls the relational condi-
tion of the social sciences, which is one of the ways that wickedness specifically
plays out in societal systems, which will be the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter2
Relational Limits
- Wickedness in Human Society
So far, the separation has dealt with different factors connecting to openness
and closure, and the nature of social structures, and we have seen that the sep-
aration does not cut cleanly between social and natural systems, but that it is
rather, as Khalil (1995, 1999) argues, a question of system organization. The
contribution thus far can be seen as a continuation of Khalil’s work. However,
Khalil focuses only on what Bhaskar (1978) refers to as the ontological (i.e. the
activity-, concept-, and space-time-dependence of social structures) and episte-
mological (i.e. the openness of social systems) limits of naturalism, and neglects
what Bhaskar calls the relational conditions of social science. Our description
of society cannot completely suffice with these naturalistic notions about open-
ness/closure and complexity, as these miss “that the self-organization of society is
not something that happens only blindly and unconsciously but depends on con-
scious, knowledgeable agents and creative social relationships” (Fuchs, 2007,
p.27). Human agents – the components of the social realm – are entities with
unique causal powers – a fact that we cannot overlook when formulating our on-
tology of these systems. In Bunge’s (1998, p.122) words: “Human beings are the
creators, reformers, and destroyers of all human social systems, and social laws
and rules are nothing but the patterns of being and becoming of such systems”.
The next section approaches this condition, but from a rather different view-
point: we will look at how the relationship between structure and emergence
evolves and plays out in social systems, and from that review the implications of
the relational condition (relating to Paper III and Törnberg and Andersson 2016).
We begin our exploration of human social systems just across the boundary into
the realm of natural systems.
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2.1 Narratives before Society
Our chimpanzee cousins (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus) illustrate a picture that
most probably represents the natural origins of wickedness and human societies.
Hominins (Homo and extinct relatives) diverged from Pan 5-7 million years ago,
and fossil remains suggest that Pan has remained similar ever since. Apart from
their only very slightly complicated tools, they have no higher level of organiza-
tion than the community, which is organized through friendships and maintained
by intimate daily contact. Like human hunter-gatherers still, and many other
species (e.g. wolves), they have a fission-fusion organization where smaller for-
aging groups continually form and dissolve within the community. This permits
the community to grow relatively large and cohesive while not putting too much
pressure on the land and its resources. Large fraction of their time is spent in
the upkeep of their relations, through touching, grooming and exchanging favors,
building a mutual trust between each member of the community that allows them
not only to (locally) hunt together, but also to lend assistance in fights between
communities and in internal conflicts and so on. This way of maintaining a group
imposes clear limits on the size of the group: two chimpanzees who have not
previously met cannot know whether to trust one another, and because of this,
when chimpanzee groups grow too large, they tend to destabilize and rupture
into two separate groups (Moffett, 2013, p240-241). Furthermore, since intimate
trust is the only form of collaboration, communities never cooperate, but compete
fiercely for territory and food (de Waal 2005; bonobo communities mostly min-
gle amicably but remain separate and compete for both territories and females;
see Kano and Ono-Vineberg 1992).
Human groups attained the capacity to expand this limitation by letting com-
munication – gossiping and story-telling – supplement direct intimate interaction
(Dunbar, 2004). Gossiping let humans know about the trustworthiness of other
humans in the group, without requiring direct interaction, thereby allowing hu-
man troops to build trust through reputation-driven indirect reciprocity (Nowak,
2006): more tightly and across significantly larger groups than other apes. This
however put great pressure on cognitive capacity, as navigating such groups de-
mands the ability to deal with constant social innovation: intrigues, new con-
stellations, secrets, lies, and the relations between others and between others and
oneself (Read, 2012). According to the “Machiavellian intelligence” (e.g. Byrne
and Whiten, 1988) and “cultural intelligence” (van Schaik and Burkart, 2011)
hypotheses, these requirements were key drivers of the evolution of human intel-
ligence and large costly brains (Aiello and Wheeler, 1995).
Regardless of the validity of these hypotheses, which are currently under
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strong development, it is clear that gossiping and narratives are deeply ingrained
in human cognition: Michotte’s (1963) experiments in attribution of causality
provides clues on just how deep. In these experiments, observers were shown
two or more small, colored rectangles in motion on a screen, and when asked
to describe what they saw, they intuitively imposed elaborate cause-and-effect
stories in which the moving rectangles were assigned intentionality and mean-
ing through intricate plots, exemplified by descriptions such as “the red ball hit
the blue ball” or “the red ball is chasing the blue ball” (see also the Thematic
Apperception Test, Murray 1938). Narrative structuring assigns intentions and
cause-and-effects to sequence of experienced events by drawing them into uni-
fied plots, through which they take on significance and meaning (Ricoeur, 1980).
There is certainly some flexibility in this description, but the narrative has to
represent events in a way that is perceived as coherent, i.e. that fulfills implicit
assumptions about human behavior and cause-and-effects. The structuring pro-
cess that configures events into such plots is interactive or dialectical, moving
between a temporal meaning that might explain or show a connection among the
events and the events’ resistance to fitting the construction (Polkinghorne, 1991).
While narrative competence emerges at an early age and is culturally uni-
versal (Mancuso, 1986), its specific coherence relies on a culturally specific un-
derstanding of human characteristics, which are at the same time constructed by
the narrative; “the narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be
called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is
the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character” (Ricoeur, 1992,
p.147-148). Narrative structuring shares some similarities to the visual config-
uration described by Gestalt psychology, in which, for example, three dots can
be seen as the angle points in a triangular figure (Gurwitsch, 1964). In the same
way, narrative structuring has a part-whole or Gestalt organization: just as spatial
organization (e.g. of a kitchen) consists of topological relations (up, down, left,
right, next to, inside, etc.), temporal organization (e.g. a trip to the store) consists
of causal and enabling relations. In this way, narrative structure is used to make
meaningful the actions of actors, public individuals and groups, and governments
and institutions, based on implicit behavioral assumptions. This capacity, ac-
cording to Lakoff’s (1987) theory, moves us to recognize the patterned bodily
experience of going from an initial state, through a sequence of events, to a final
state. This source-path-goal schematic pattern serves as the metaphoric origin for
the type of temporal organization that makes the elements of episodes and stories
understandable as parts of a temporal whole (Polkinghorne, 1991).
Narratives are not only used for the understanding of external actors; they
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are also widely believed to be the way we understand ourselves (Polkinghorne,
1988). When people we meet tell us the story of their lives, we are not surprised
that they have one – in fact, we would be surprised (or even worried) if, in trying
to get to know someone, all he or she had to share were a series of unconnected
events (see Lacan’s notion of a psychotic structuring Lacan 1960. Stories are im-
portant for having a vision of the self and to understanding and connect to others.
The reconstruction of a coherent self-narrative has been held as a therapeutic goal
since Freud’s inauguration of psychoanalysis, which Spence (1982) describes as
the art of turning disordered pieces of information from patients into coherent
stories. This view conceptualizes anxiety as an evolved imperative to narratively
relate ourselves to the larger community, and shows clearly how narratives may
have evolved to align strongly individualist members to form a functional group
in early communities.
2.2 Narratives in Society
However, while gossiping and story-telling allowed Homo sapiens to form larger
and more stable bands, even gossip has its limits: the maximum “natural” size of
a group bonded by gossip is about 150 individuals (Dunbar, 1992, 1995; Dunbar
and Shultz, 2007). As we pass this threshold, informal organization starts break-
ing down, and there starts to be the need for things like formal ranks, titles and
rules to keep the group together. Clearly, while gossiping allowed a powerful ex-
tension of group size for early humans, it was not a foundation which could hold
together cities and empires with thousands, and eventually hundreds of millions
of inhabitants.
The way that this transition occurred holds central significance for the rela-
tionship between individuals and structures in society, and for how we can un-
derstand societal systems. Passing this threshold occurred through an exaptation
(Bonifati, 2010) of narratives, in which the use of narratives and story-telling no
longer only included individuals as actors, but also collective actors and social
structures. In other words, the cognitive tools that we developed to deal with
sub-wicked systems, story-telling and gossiping, were applied to deal also with
emergent social structures: the groups and social structures became actors in nar-
ratives (Henshilwood and d’Errico, 2011).
This most likely first played out in the form of sizable – in recent egalitar-
ian hunter-gatherers sometimes 2,000 strong – communities composed of sev-
eral bands whose members were distinguished on the basis of multiple society-
specific, and socially acquired, labels (Moffett, 2013). These features made it
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easy for humans, unlike wolves and chimps, to recognize members of other
groups at a glance (Diamond, 1992, p.220). Through such labeling, they accom-
plished what Moffett (2013) calls “Anonymous Society”, where one no longer
need to personally know another member to know how to relate.
This allows large groups to cooperate, as strangers can cooperate success-
fully by identifying one another through symbols and belief in common myths.
Through this common ground, social entities such as organizations and commu-
nities, attain “the causal power to influence the behaviour of human individu-
als” (Elder-Vass, 2007d, p.465). Instead of organizing through the interaction
between every single individual, they organized toward a mythical idea of a col-
lective, rooted in common stories and labels (e.g. Johnson and Krüger, 2015).
Large-scale human cooperation – whether a modern state, a medieval church, an
ancient city or an archaic tribe – is ultimately rooted in common narratives which
enable mutual trust: two tribesmen who have never previously met can cooperate
on the basis of their common membership in a thought in-group, defined by a
complex web of shared belief in stories about the world. Similarly, today, two
persons who have never met can cooperate and exchange goods through their
common belief in ideas such as trade, capitalism, and the value of money.
In small, traditional societies, common stories of ghosts, gods and spirits may
have functioned to cement the social order, and today, our modern institutions
function on the same basis (Harari, 2014). Just as rumors and stories function
in small groups to assign characteristics to the actors involved, we today assign
human characteristics, agency, and even emotional states to imagined emergent
actors. This can be observed in brands being seen as trustworthy or manly, or in
the depiction of “the market” as worried or stressed. Such characteristics hardly
make sense as descriptions of imagined collectives, but to an extent, the sto-
ries become self-fulfilling prophecies (if you own stocks, and you understand the
market as a “worried” actor, this is likely to affect your trading decisions so as to
induce volatility.)
In this way, narratives are used not only to understand the inter-human world,
but also the roles and behavior of institutions and social structures: humans not
only adapt to emergent structures, but they do so by assigning meaning and roles
to them. They shape our behavior and organize our society, yet they – strictly
speaking – do not exist outside of our collective stories. Over the years, there has
developed an incredibly complex network of such stories. Within this network,
ideas such as “the market” can accumulate immense power. We navigate this
symbolic network, using stories as building blocks to construct new stories.
This symbolic network has increasingly come to dominate how we under-
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stand the world and ourselves, in what Baudrillard (1994) calls the “precession
of simulacra”. As this operates in the same symbolic landscape in which we un-
derstand ourselves, this is also the lens through which we see ourselves: we relate
ourselves to the categories and groups to which we see ourselves as being part.
The dual reality of humanity is hence mirrored in our individual selves: Lacan
(1960) described this fundamental split as the mirror stage – in which the Sym-
bolic, and Imaginary is formed, separated from the Real – the relation between
which determines our very structuring: our narratives can never fully capture re-
ality, which is reflected in cracks and tears in our selves. In other words, just as
the defecation ceremony of dik diks is multi-dimensional, so does human sym-
bolism and narratives cut across levels – but in an immensely more flexible and
powerful way.
Let us, briefly, connect this historical exposition of the nature on narrative and
the evolution of societal systems to contemporary social theory on the agency-
structure relationship. As we have seen, wickedness is defined by the feedback
interaction between complexity and complicatedness – the dialectics between
agency and structure: just as in complex systems, patterns emerge from the in-
teraction between constituents, in wicked systems, however, this emergence is
reflexive (Goldspink and Kay, 2007): the patterns are observed, and met by adap-
tation from the individuals in the system. The narrative nature of human wicked
systems means that in societal systems, this interaction between social structure
and emergence takes a particular form: narrative, meaning, intentionality, and so
on, are the building blocks of social and societal systems. This does not mean to
argue that individuals should be treated as only products of narratives. As Kaides-
oja (2007, p.82) points out: “it is surely one thing to say that the conversations, in
which biological individuals engage in their lives, in many ways shape and mod-
ify their powers, and another to claim that people are nothing but conversational
constructs.”
As we have furthermore seen, social actors, unlike the components of systems
in the natural world, are capable of collective intentionality (Searle, 2010, 1995,
2006), sophisticated communication and creative collaboration, including what
Sawyer (2003) calls “improvised dialogues” that make “distributed creativity”
possible. This capacity to evaluate the social world is not limited to the external,
but just as important is the capacity of self-awareness and reflexivity: human be-
ings, as Sayer (2005) points out, are “evaluative beings”, continually monitoring
and assessing their own behavior and that of others, in a narrative form. Evalu-
ative beings tend to engage in what Archer (2003) calls “internal conversation”,
that is, processes of continuous “internal deliberation”, which is “self-reflexive
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because it is a self-critical exercise” (Archer, 2003, p.105-106). The importance
of these dialogue has been stressed in different contexts by a number of leading
social theorists, such as Giddens (e.g. 1992), Archer (e.g. 2000), Sayer (2005),
Elder-Vass (2007c, 2010), and Mouzelis (2007). Fleetwood (2008) has even gone
as far as arguing that that reflexive deliberation via internal conversation is the
“process that links social structure and agency” (Fleetwood, 2008, p.260). This,
however, seems to underestimate other factors, such as more deep-lying social
instincts, including emotions (Elster, 1999; Emirbayer, 1996), as well as what
Bourdieu (2005) terms “habitus”.
This idea of self-evaluation also resonates with Taylor’s (1989) discussion of
“strong evaluation”, that is, human beings’ capacity to evaluate their own pref-
erences and beliefs, and thus to form “second-order desires” (see e.g. Callinicos,
2004). This is essentially what allows humans to change the games that they are
playing, as they are playing them, since the notion of internal conversations em-
phasize that “our relationship to the world is not simply one of accommodation
or becoming skilled in its games, but, at least in some ways, one of wanting to
be different and wanting the world and its games to be different” (Sayer, 2005,
p.35). This brings us into the importance of meaning and value in the context of
human social structures in general, and in their qualitative change in particular.
2.3 Narratives and Social Structures
The exposition about narratives in human communities in this chapter has served
to show how “agents are constrained and enabled by ideas, rules, norms and
discourses” (Kurki, 2008, p.228), and that “‘meanings’ or ‘ways of conceiving’
that are dominant come to inform the intentions and the actions of agents” (ibid,
p.224). As we have seen, both ideational and material aspects have to be brought
in to adequately provide a view on the causal roles of social structures (Elder-
Vass, 2017). Hence, when causation in social systems occurs through symbols
and meaning, analysis becomes interpretation, or Weber’s Verstehen. This is part
of what Bhaskar (1979) calls the relational condition of social science, in that it
implies that social researchers are equipped with unique tools to understand the
dynamic in such systems, since they are themselves part of their own research
subject. This gives them access to the actors’ points of view, through the under-
standing of meaning. Such a research method implies entering into the shoes of
the other, and treating the actor as a subject, rather than an object of our obser-
vations (Morehouse, 1994; Spradley, 2016). It also implies that unlike objects
in the natural world, human actors are not simply the product of the pulls and
38 CHAPTER 2. RELATIONAL LIMITS
pushes of external forces: individuals are seen to create the world by organizing
their own understanding of it and giving it meaning.
Mechanisms in natural systems exist regardless of their meaning, while social
structures are what they are through their meaning for the underlying individuals
(Geertz, 1994). For example, if money had no meaning for individuals, it could
not function as an explanatory mechanism: it would not be able to affect behavior.
In other words, it is the interpretation of social structures by the underlying actors
that grants them causative abilities; value and meaning are the stuff of the social
realm, and so research is inherently about meaning. Because social structures
exist only in virtue of the activity they govern, they do not exist independently
of the conception that the agents possess of what they are doing in their activ-
ity; i.e. some theory of these activities. Since social structures are themselves
social products, social activity must be given a social explanation, and cannot be
explained solely by reference to non-social parameters (Bhaskar, 1979, 2010).
Because of this, hermeneutics is often seen as replacements to causal expla-
nations of events within social science (Ricoeur and Thompson, 1983), but, as
Archer et al. (2013) argue, this is taking it too far. Without hermeneutics, we
cannot understand the meaning of an action, but identifying the meaning is not
enough to explain what brought about the act: there are also beliefs, intentions,
motivations, etc., at play (Bhaskar, 2010). There is hence a double hermeneutics
in play in social systems, as “meaning has to be understood, it cannot be measured
or counted, and hence there is always an interpretive or hermeneutic element in
social science” (Sayer, 2000, p.17). In natural systems, the scientist attempts to
interpret and create meaning in the object, but in social systems, the object has
already been interpreted by the objects of study, an interpretation which is even
part of its causal capacity. The formation of concepts is not only a part of the sci-
entific work, as in the natural sciences, but also part of the scientific object. This
is the “hermeneutic premises” (Collier, 1994) of the social sciences. Because of
this, our view of societal systems is necessarily historical, value-laden and “situ-
ated”: there is no view from nowhere, so while our perspectives and knowledge is
necessarily partial and relative, it is the best we can hope for: without somewhere
to stand, no knowledge is possible (Nagel, 1989).
In short, since value and meaning are the stuff of the social realm, and what
grants social facts their explanatory power, there will necessarily be an inter-
pretive or hermeneutic element in the social sciences. In fact, the “mechanism”
metaphor should be used with care, as it implies a problematic Humean notion
of causality (e.g. Harré, 1985): social mechanisms are not mechanical, and the
adoption of such a conception of causality “makes it very difficult ... even to
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suggest a plausible theory of human agency” (Ellis, 2002, p.197). We can talk
about generative mechanisms of social structures because they do make some-
thing happen, but while doing so, we must not forget that the effects of structures
are mediated by agency: in social life, nothing happens without the activation of
the causal powers of people (Carter and New, 2005). Hence, values and meaning
are deeply connected to qualitative change, since humans are capable of navi-
gating and transforming them through social action. For example, when studying
how changing pay structures affect employee behavior in companies (e.g. Lazear,
2000), it is easily forgotten that the desires and values underlying these behav-
iors had to be taught, as workers would otherwise work no longer than necessary
to meet their traditional needs. Or put in another way: sociotechnical change
is to a large extent about change in values and meaning – and hence contains
hermeneutic elements – showing how qualitative change is inextricably entan-
gled with meaning (Geels, 2005; Geels and Schot, 2007). The nature and effects
of such change in wicked systems will be the topic of the next section.
2.4 Innovation in Society
We have so far looked at how the relationship between structural and dynamic
complexity plays out in social systems, and we will now turn toward a second
central feature of wicked systems: the way that innovation drives constant quali-
tative change and the increase of these two complexities.
As has already been noted, wicked systems are deeply connected to innova-
tion: on the micro-level, they are arenas of and for innovation, in which their
competing constituents try to outsmart one-another; on the macro-level, they
are characterized by a combination of self-propelling cascades of transformation,
and periods of stasis and locks-ins. These cascades are self-propagating waves
of qualitative “reconfigurations” of and by components, unfolding distributedly
and locally in “the adjacent possible” (Kauffman, 1996, 2000) and propagating
across neighborhoods in the seamless web, potentially with system-wide implica-
tions (Geels, 2002, 2011; Lane and Maxfield, 1997; Lane, 2011b, 2016; Schiffer,
2005). In other words, qualitative change in wicked systems is driven by posi-
tive feedback, change driving change, making both constant innovation and deep
uncertainty hallmark properties of wicked systems.
Wicked systems both enable open-ended innovation, and are themselves pro-
duced by it. They enable innovation since the complicatedness (afforded by the
technical) and the complexity (afforded by the social) are both necessary compo-
nents of open-ended innovation. Without the structural complexity, it is impossi-
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ble to construct sophisticated and specialized systems; unstructured system inter-
actions would make for unmanageably design spaces, in practice impossible to
explore through creative processes (Stankiewicz, 2000). Without the dynamical
complexity, it is hard to imagine any efficacious adaptation process, as these rely
on exploration of design spaces through e.g. parallelisms, feedback, and mass-
interaction. They are produced by innovation, since the innovations themselves
are structurally complex, and become part of a dynamically complex, seamless
web. This positive-feedback dynamic is not a functionality of the system: their
lack of what Khalil (1995) calls artificiality means that their macro-level is not
aimed at fulfilling any functions, but that it is merely the emergent and aggregated
sum of externalities of the underlying innovation processes.
These features of wicked systems also play out in a particular way in human
society. This relates to what e.g. Lane (2011a); Lane et al. (2009b); Lane (2016);
Lane et al. (2011) call the “Innovation Society”: a society where innovation is no
longer just a means of solving problems, but where innovation is ideologically
sublimated and has become entrenched at the very heart of how society functions
– where innovation is important in itself quite regardless of what gets innovated.
The Innovation Society is a society organized around the dynamics of its own
wicked nature.
The development of such a society was crucially enabled by the capacity of
social structures to affect their own constituents, which has allowed the innova-
tion feedback cycle of wicked system to become reified into a goal in its own
right, elevating it from emergent dynamics to a social goal. This has led to a
situation where constant innovation has become entrenched in society (Wimsatt,
1986), and thereby necessary for its functioning and stability. This dependency
suggests a rather paradoxical stability: we have become locked into a state of
constant explosive change (plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose, indeed!)
Through this process an inherent property of wicked systems has become a core
value in society, expressed culturally as an ideology that permeates it (Lane et al.,
2011)
That innovation has become a project for innovation itself is, as a natural
phenomenon, an entirely new thing – unique to human culture. But it is not an
essential feature of human culture, and it has not always been that way. The
idea that we can improve society and our own quality of life by innovation is
characteristic of the Enlightenment and signifies a drastic shift in ideology: from
the view that we ought to preserve a God-given social order to the view that that
we ought to use science (in a broad sense) to understand the world and master it
so as to increase our wellbeing. There are of course several sub-ideologies that
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propose different ways of organizing innovation to achieve such improvements in
well-being – most importantly based on either bottom-up self-organization or top-
down management – neither of which has proven itself to be potent as solutions
to the sustainability problems that we face today.
Lane et al. (2011) summarize the Innovation Society and its ideology as fol-
lows:
Our society’s dependence on innovation cascades is expressed
in, and sustained by, an increasingly widespread way of thinking,
which we will term the Innovation Society ideology. This ideol-
ogy underlies almost all current discourse about business strategy
and governmental policy. The following four propositions form its
central core: (1) the principal aim of policy is sustained economic
growth, interpreted as a steady increase in GDP; (2) the engine of
this growth is innovation, interpreted as the creation of new kinds of
artifacts; (3) Which new kinds of artifacts have value is decided by
the market; (4) the price to pay for not innovating, or for subordi-
nating innovation to other values, like cultural enrichment or social
justice is prohibitively high: competition, at the level of firms and of
national economies, dooms dawdlers to failure, which translates into
economic decline and social chaos.
The capacity of societal systems to relate to their own emergent phenomena
was also key to permitting the expansion of the human sociotechnical system:
it allowed it to be subjected to itself – its process and conditions – permitted it
to improve its own function, and through this, increase the speed and magnitude
its cycle of innovation. The “Great Acceleration” (Moore, 2014; Steffen et al.,
2015a; Waters et al., 2016) may be understood as the quantitative signature of this
qualitative explosion in diversity. But the development can also be seen directly
in a veritable explosion in types of artifacts: if 3 million years ago, our ancestors
had essentially one kind of artifact, and 50 000 years ago, maybe a few hundred,
today’s inhabitant of New York City can choose among over 1010 different bar-
coded items (Lane, 2016).
The introduction of new artifacts necessarily involves changes in new pat-
terns of interaction among people, not only through the use of the artifacts, but
also through, for example, their production, marketing and maintenance. There
is an inextricable linkage between the introduction of new artifacts into a society
and transformations in the social relations and organization of that society. As
people’s living conditions and social relations transform around the presence of
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the artifact, they may become incompatible with the institutional and organiza-
tional structures of the old; structures that used to facilitate now become dead-
weight. This is a point of conflict, where new organization may replace the old,
where agency can play an important role, as the developing structures have not
yet become entrenched. A society’s institutions emerge in interaction with the ar-
tifacts and the technology of that society, through highly unpredictable feedback
processes: on the small scale, a new office computer system may result in new
company work processes; on a large scale, the hand-mill co-evolved into a society
with feudal lords, and the steam mill into a society with industrial capitalists. The
institutions that form around technologies need to be in a sense compatible with
the technology with which they interact: when institutions become misaligned
with the artifacts underlying them, instabilities occur, creating the opportunity for
social and technological change. As the rapid progress of artifact innovation con-
tinues, such societal instabilities are continually sparked on all levels of society.
Societal structures effective in harnessing the possibilities of available artifacts
gradually turn into shackles as the artifacts continue to evolve. The breakdown of
structure leads to an “era of ferment”, where a set of alternatives are competing
openly for the development of new structures co-evolving with the development
of new technology (Geels, 2006; Grübler, 2003).
Such feedback process of co-evolution results in unpredictable social and
technological transformation, making it highly difficult to achieve intended so-
cial effects through technological development. But such technological change
is in any case the exception: artifacts are generally not evaluated on the basis of
the transformative effects they will have on societal structure, but only evaluated
locally. It is this type of atomistic evaluation processes that decides the value
of new artifacts: it is the what we refer to when we say “the market”. Atom-
istic rationality has taken over a larger and larger part of what used to be part of
the realm of political decisions, while politics is increasingly left to priming the
pump of innovation. Progress is seen as inevitable, whatever it may entail (see
also Ellul, 1967).
The stability of this system is based on competition on all levels, which,
through the interlinkage of markets associated to neoliberalism, has now become
global (e.g. Harvey, 2007). This competition out-crowds everything but more in-
novation. Any attempts to subordinate innovation to other values, like cultural
enrichment or social justice, are made impossible by competition at the level
of individuals, firms and national economies. Competition dooms any potential
Samaritans to failure, which at the national level – which ostensibly has some
level of political play – would translate into economic decline and social chaos.
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This in practice undermines any attempt at going against the stream, except on the
global level – where necessary structures to scaffold agency are largely lacking1
(Dunford, 2000).
2.5 Innovation meets Uncertainty
The production and use of innovation will naturally result in some environmental
and social externalities: changes that cannot be predicted (Sveiby et al., 2009). As
society becomes more entangled and wicked, it is becoming increasingly difficult
to respond to these externalities, as the dynamical consequences of action in such
a web is shrouded in ontological uncertainty (Lane and Maxfield, 2005). This
uncertainty not only prevents us from designing effective interventions, with-
out high likelihoods of causing unexpected troubles in other domains, but it also
keeps us from aligning and organizing action in the first place (e.g. Gardner et al.,
1990; Gintis, 2000). This is indeed illustrated by the enormous difficulties in or-
ganizing an adequate response to climate change. That it, indeed, is even harder
can be seen by comparison with similar global challenges just a few decades ago
(Gareau, 2013; Laube et al., 2014).
If these externalities of innovations are left without response, they accumu-
late until they pass certain thresholds and develop in to full-scale crises (e.g.
Rockström et al., 2009). In the case of biological innovation, such crises seem
to become increasingly rare as the structural complexity of the system increases.
With more species, ecosystems become more stable, and the size of the avail-
able design space increases, both resulting in increased capacity to respond to
externalities (Allesina and Tang, 2012; Stankiewicz, 2000). In society, however,
innovation seems to have the opposite effect. As we have seen, more innova-
tion makes our society more and more wicked and uncertain, and hence makes
its problems harder and harder to anticipate and respond to. Hence, society will
produce more crises, they will be harder to solve, and the system will develop
toward increasing instability (see also Ponting, 2007; Tainter, 1990).
Uncertainty forces us to be shortsighted by preventing us from building suf-
ficient certainty for large-scale alignment and action. A shorter and shorter fore-
sight horizon, combined with a virtually un-bounded horizon for consequences
of actions, makes wicked systems susceptible to self-undermining: what we typ-
ically refer to as unsustainability. Societal evolution is thereby prone to sponta-
neously and collectively embark on pathways leading to new dynamical regimes
1There have certainly been an increase of multi-national political organizations, in part in an
attempt to meet this development, but the balance of power has clearly shifted.
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that may be arbitrarily disadvantageous (e.g. the Anthropocene; Steffen et al.
2015a). Control demands a global overview, but growth and change is local and
demands no such overview, so wicked systems may outgrow any capacity for
governing them.
As organized efforts to respond strategically become more difficult, as the
anticipation of the effects of actions becomes clouded in ontological uncertainty,
they are met instead by responses whose consequences are never even taken into
account: innovation responds only to the myopic opportunities that crises pro-
vide. In other words, like the alcoholic curing a hangover, society tries to solve
its problems by applying more of what caused them. This is a condition that Beck
(1992) calls “reflexive moderniy”, in which modernity “becomes its own theme”,
as the focus of innovation increasingly becomes to alleviate the negative effects
of previous innovation. But every such ‘solution’ is not only unlikely to solve
the highly entangled problem (in part as it would imply undermining their own
raison d’être) but also has the potential to produce new problems.
As Lane (2016) observes, the result is a cycle of problem-solution-problem
with potentially disastrous effects. Lane exemplifies this with the obesity epi-
demic, initiated by a large surplus in cheap available calories, brought about by
innovation cascades in agriculture. This resulted in innovations in food process-
ing to provide higher returns to producers and distributers from the cheap calorie
surplus. This, in turn, resulted in changing patterns of consumption, followed
by a rapid increase in obesity rates. The market responded to this problem with
waves of innovation in the diet and pharmaceutical industries, with huge mar-
ket successes, but no discernible effect in decreasing the obesity epidemic. The
social results of these dynamics have been catastrophic: the obesity epidemic is
today seen by many in the public health community as the principal public health
challenge of the twenty-first century.
Through the lens of the innovation ideology, the wicked problems we are fac-
ing tend to start to look like engineering problems, i.e. solvable through more
innovation. As Kingsnorth (2011, p.x) points out, even the green movement have
fallen into this perspective, seeing unsustainability “as an engineering challenge
which must be overcome with technological solutions guided by the neutral gaze
of Science, [which] has forced it into a ghetto from which it may never escape”.
Through this lens, the reinvigoration of naturalism, following from society’s in-
creasing impact on environmental systems, seems less a result of an increased
understanding of the complexity of societal systems, and more a sign of a perva-
sive innovation ideology.
Chapter3
From Naturalism to Realism
As we have seen, while it is increasingly uncontroversial to claim that society is
complex, complexity seems to represent a rather large number of system proper-
ties. In approaching society, the assumption of mainstream complexity science
has been that societal complexity is essentially similar to the complexity of the
kind of systems with which it has shown great success, such as bird flocks or
fish schools (Mitchell, 2009). The undeniable structural complexity of society
has been seen as merely a complicating factor: the only thing missing in the at-
tempts to understand society is more time, effort and funding. This has not only
been the foundation for the way that society has been approached methodologi-
cally, but also scientifically, as it has been seen as a green light for the same type
of positivist application of formal methods that have proven successful in their
application to complex and complicated system.
The above systemic examination of ontological categories implies that this
assumption has been erroneous. Most importantly, it seems that the complex-
ity of most natural systems is in fact rather different from that of society: the
former is “complex” and the latter is “wicked”. This separation can indeed be
seen in how the “mainstream” understanding of complexity, associated e.g. to
the Santa Fe Institute, differs from the understanding of many social scientists
of what has been understood to be the same system category. This division is
reflected in e.g. Morin’s (2008) separation between “restricted complexity” and
“general complexity”, as well as in Byrne’s (2005) “simple” and “complex” com-
plexity. In the terminology of this essay, the former describes complexity, and the
latter wickedness.
Wicked systems are certainly complex, in the sense that they display dynam-
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ical complexity, but they are not only complex. They are heterogeneous, inter-
connected, nonlinear, far-from-equilibria, emergent and adaptive, as suggested
by Complexity Science, but also open and contingent, with any patterns only
local in time and space, and subject to ubiquitous qualitative change. This is fur-
thermore related to the way that emergence plays out, with restricted complexity
approaches focusing on the emergence of the whole from the parts, thereby ne-
glecting, or even rejecting, the role of top-down causation, while generalized
complexity approaches instead emphasize feedback between structure and emer-
gence (Elder-Vass, 2010).
This calls for a science of wickedness that, in the words of Reed and Harvey
(1992, p.359), “treats nature and society as if they were ontologically open and
historically constituted; hierarchically structured, yet interactively complex; non-
reductive and indeterminate, yet amenable to rational explanation”. Since wicked
systems are not closed, we cannot approach them only through formal models,
and hence, as Cilliers (2002, p.X) puts it, the study of what we call wickedness
“is not going to introduce us to a brave new world in which we will be able to
control our destiny; it confronts us with the limits of human understanding.” Our
understanding of complex systems has implied a way to untangle their intricate
webs of causation, but a deeper understanding of wicked systems instead seems
to imply learning about the boundaries of knowledge and just how “how little we
can know about the world” (Koppl, 2010).
This does not have postmodernist implications for whether we should do sci-
ence, but it does carry significant implications for how we should do science.
While different framings of the same system are possible, reality does have a say
in how they are made. Wickedness suggests a perspective which accepts neither
positivism nor relativism: it recognizes that our scientific descriptions of reality
are social constructs, but also that “they are constructs made by reality and there-
fore shaped by reality” (Byrne and Callaghan, 2013, p.33). In other words, this
complexity speaks to realist (rather than postmodernist) social theories (Walby,
2007).
This connection to realist theory can also be seen in the way emergence needs
to be understood in wicked systems. This term has generally, implicitly or explic-
itly, been understood as epistemological concept: “‘emergent’ was construed as
‘unexplained’ by means of contemporary theories” (Bunge, 2003, p.13). This
view was first represented by British emergentists in the late-19th early 20th cen-
turies, but can now be identified in a range of work on complexity, including
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that of Ernst Mayr1, Tony Lawson2, Keith Sawyer3, Peter Hedström4, and Niklas
Luhmann (see Wan, 2011, p.67). A central part of wicked systems, however,
is what Kaidesoja (2009) calls an “ontological concept of emergence”, which
is real and unaffected by our knowledge of its processes: “Emergence is often
intriguing but not mysterious: explained emergence is still emergence” (Bunge,
2003, p.21). Emergence is an aspect of dynamical complexity, implying rela-
tionally distributed mechanisms, not a function of our knowledge. The wicked
systems perspective hence follows the ontological understanding of emergence
of e.g. Archer, Bhaskar, Gell-Mann, Searle and Elder-Vass: “Emergence is the
idea that a whole can have properties (or powers) that are not possessed by its
parts-or, to put it more rigorously, properties that would not be possessed by its
parts if they were not organised as a group into the form of this particular kind of
whole” (Elder-Vass, 2007a, p.28).
The view, and the wicked systems perspective in general, has much in com-
mon with Mario Bunge’s “emergentist-systemist” philosophy (e.g. Bunge, 1979a,
2000a,b), and with the related (see Danermark et al., 1997, p.4) critical realism
of e.g. Archer et al. (2013), and Bhaskar (2013), in particular Reed and Harvey’s
(1996; 1992) “complex realism”, further developed by e.g. Harvey (2009), Byrne
(2002, 2004, 2005, 1998), Byrne and Ragin (2009), and Byrne and Callaghan
(2013). This section will serve to see how these ideas connect and relate to
wickedness, to see how Complexity Science can learn from social theory regard-
ing how to approach wicked systems in general, and society in particular. We
begin by looking at the mainstream complex systems ontology and its develop-
ment.
3.1 Society in Mainstream Complexity Science
Complexity Science developed through and around new computational methods,
and at the heart of this methodology lies computer simulation, which crucially
1E.g. “the characteristics of the whole cannot (not even in theory) be deduced from the most
complete knowledge of the components” (Mayr, 1982, p.63)
2E.g. something is “emergent if there is a sense in which it has arisen out of some ‘lower’ level,
being conditioned by and dependent upon, but not but not predictable from, the properties found at
the lower level.” (Lawson, 2006a, p.176)
3E.g. “at the global system level are patterns, structures, or properties that are difficult to explain
in terms of system’s components and their interactions” (Sawyer, 2005, p.4)
4E.g. “social emergence refers to social properties that cannot, in practice, be predicted by
knowing everything there is to know about the pre-emergent properties of the parts” (Hedström,
2005, p.74)
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brings the capability to describe the entities and interaction rules of dynamical
systems so as to put it all “into motion” (Fontana, 2006). The typical model
in this tradition has a microlevel of interacting nodes existing in a pre-defined
environment. Having set up the rules and the environment, the system is allowed
to play out, and the results and patterns that emerge from the often long causal
chains of interaction are studied. This is a highly flexible methodology that made
it possible to study and visualize dynamics that are inaccessible both to analytical
mathematics and to unaided human cognition. This can be viewed as an extension
of the study of the micro aggregation from additive cases, as in classical linear
and mathematical methods, to situations where “the whole is more than the sum
of its parts”.
As so far described, complexity science could be seen just as a methodolog-
ical toolkit allowing the study of a broader range of phenomena than previous
tools – which would be all well and good. But the “social life” of these methods
(Law et al., 2011) has increasingly led to the development of a corresponding
social ontology: the labeling of society as a “complex system” clearly goes be-
yond a methodological claim, and into the realm of ontology (Fontana, 2010).
As Perona (2007) argues, Complexity Science is guilty of a “fallacy of misplaced
concreteness”: in Lawson’s (2005) terminology, the “ontic” (description of real-
ity) is not separated from the “theoretic” (descriptions of the models), meaning
that reality becomes seen as artificial and closed.
This is playing out much in the same way as the development of neoclassical
economics, which is widely understood to have grown its ontological perspec-
tives on the economy on the basis of its methods, as Debreu (1986, p. 1265) puts
it: “as a formal model of an economy acquires a mathematical life of its own,
it becomes the object of an inexorable process in which rigor, generality, and
simplicity are relentlessly pursued”. Through this process, an equilibrium-based
ontology developed within economics, as the assumptions required for the ap-
plication of the mathematical methods increasingly turned into theory about the
nature of the world, and factors that could not readily be brought into the math-
ematical machinery were simply disregarded. Models were no longer separate
from theory, as methodology transformed into epistemology, in turn – over time
– transforming into ontology (Fontana, 2010) – or, put more simply: economists
found a hammer, and everything started to look like nails.
In Complexity Science, that hammer is primarily simulation. This has led to
an understanding of society that emphasizes micro-level interaction, which can
be seen in definitions of complexity. Johnson (2009, p.1) defines complexity as
“the study of the phenomena which emerge from a collection of interacting ob-
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jects”. Similarly, Mitchell (2009, p.13) describes a complex system as “a system
in which large networks of components with no central control and simple rules of
operation give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated information pro-
cessing, and adaptation via learning and evolution”. Holland (2006, p.1) agrees,
but is almost even more restrictive by stating that complex systems “are systems
that have a large numbers of components, often called agents, that interact and
adapt or learn.” This is very much in line with Joshua Epstein’s understanding of
society as a complex system growing from the bottom up (Epstein, 1996).
All of these fit in well as descriptions of the ontology of most simulation
models, but as descriptions of society they seem overly focused on the individual
agent level. As Lane (1993, p.194) puts it, these models “offer only very limited
scope to the emergence of new structures–and, so far, none at all to the emergence
of higher-level entities.” Social structures are seen as merely patterns emerging
from the behavior of underlying agents, or as Jarvie puts it (cited in Bhaskar 2010,
p.55), in these perspectives “army is just the plural of soldier”. Despite Complex-
ity Science being associated to a criticism of reductionism, it seems to fit neatly
into the realm of ontological individualism. As Epstein (2006, p.37) readily ad-
mits, “classical emergentism holds that the parts (the microspecification) cannot
explain the whole (the macrostructure), while to the agent-based modeler, it is
precisely the generative sufficiency of the parts (the microspecification) that con-
stitutes the whole’s explanation! In this particular sense, agent-based modeling
is reductionist.”
While such assumptions may be appropriate in complex systems, where only
first order emergence applies (Gilbert, 2002), the “reflexive” (Goldspink and Kay,
2007) second order emergence of wicked systems is completely at odds with such
an understanding, as it emphasizes the reality and causal capacities of emergent
structures. These are essentially what enables the structural complexity of such
systems. Hence, while the methods of mainstream complexity may provide help-
ful aid in the first half of our science of wickedness, i.e. casting light on the het-
erogeneous, interconnected, nonlinear, far-from-equilibria, emergent, and adap-
tive nature of society, its methodology is based on an ontological perspective that
does not allows us to approach other aspects of wickedness – i.e. that it is also
open and contingent, with patterns only local in time and space, and ubiquitous
qualitative change – let alone the value-laden and meaningful nature of society in
particular. Let us therefore look at alternative ways of looking at the complexity
of society, which takes into account both structure and emergence, by leaning on
ideas developed in critical realism and in Mario Bunge’s emergentist-systemism.
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Figure 3.1: Wicked systems shows how the meeting between structure and agency, emer-
gence and hierarchy, complexity and complicatedness, and so on, results in a qualita-
tively different ontological system category.
3.2 Fact and Action in Wicked Society
As we have seen, the wickedness perspective argues for the causal capacities and
reality not only of the components, but of the structures that emerge from their
interaction. As we have also seen, this meeting between structure and dynamics
mirrors a metatheoretical meeting between the “fact” and “action” paradigms in
sociology (Gilje and Grimen, 1992), and indeed between structure and agency –
one of the most central questions of sociology.
In this tension between what basically amounts to whether to treat society as
a complicated or complex system – both of which are subsets of reductionism –
the wicked system perspective clearly points toward a third option, where we in-
stead attempt to take both agency and structure into account, and where reality is
seen as a dialectic between them (e.g. Wight, 2006). Such a theoretical perspec-
tive has been developed by theorists such as Archer, Layder, Pawson and Sayer –
an “analytical dualism” (e.g. Archer, 1982, 1996; Bhaskar, 2008; Layder, 1985)
that starts from the ontological claim, following from the “ontological concept of
emergence”, that structures and agents each possess distinct properties and pow-
ers in their own right, referred to as sui generis, and that they are very different
type of entities, rather than as two parts of the same process (as in Anthony Gid-
den’s (1984) “structuration theory”). This has multiple implications, such as that
the goal of social analysis is to keep structure and agency apart, to study the link
and interaction between them, not to reduce one to the other (Danermark et al.,
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1997).
While social structures are not “powerful particulars” like individuals, in the
sense that they can produce “observable effect in certain conditions and in a rel-
atively autonomous way” (Kaidesoja, 2007, p.81), they are endowed with sui
generis properties and powers. As we have seen, they are characterized by ante-
riority: they precede agency, not in the sense that they could exist without human
action, but in the sense that humans only reproduce or transform social structures,
they do not create them. Property relations, linguistic systems and legal systems
are existing features of the world into which we are born, they are not things that
we create at birth. Their anteriority points to another important property: they are
relatively enduring. They are granted this longevity through the material expres-
sions that are always part of social practices, in a mutual dependence between
material practices and the formation of meaning (Danermark et al., 1997; Törn-
berg, 2016a). Social structures also have powers: they are capable of “motivating
or discouraging, constraining and enabling certain sorts of human action” (Carter
and New, 2005, p.10), for example: unequal wealth distributions will tend to con-
strain the poor and enable the rich. Hodgson’s (2009) concept of “reconstitutive
downward causation” is also useful here, capturing the elusive notion that “the
whole, to some extent, reconstitutes the parts” (Hodgson, 2009, p.168).
Individuals are similarly equipped with sui generis properties and powers:
they are self-conscious, reflexive, emotional, intentional, cognitive, and so on.
Their reflexivity and symbolic abilities endow them with the powers to formulate
plans, organize project, pursue interests, etc.: it is people who make history; they
inhabit the social world, and are able to reflect upon, seek to change, or even
overthrow the social structures, according to their own interests and views.
The understanding of emergence of structure from agents emphasizes that
there is no singular “humanity”, but only plural and heterogeneous mortals, giv-
ing their politics its organic, interconnected and contingent nature (Arendt, 1958).
Hence, social structures are not planned, but often unexpected: people do not
marry to reproduce the nuclear family, nor do they work to reproduce the capi-
talist economy, but these are nevertheless the unintended consequences of their
activity (Bhaskar, 2010). Social structures are both the cause for and caused by
action: we tend to behave according to the wage-labor relations, which in turn
reproduces the structure of wage labor, in turn generating new action, and so on.
This interplay between social structure and agency occurs over time, meaning
that their emergence takes the form of a continual process. “Causality, in virtue
of its transitivity, gives aid and comfort neither to the holist nor to the individual-
ist. The causal chain just keeps rolling along.” (Sober, 1980, p.95).
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Individuals, and the emergent structures following from their relations, con-
tingently combine to produce second and third-order emergent structures. This
means that the world is not only differentiated, but stratified: it has different lev-
els characterized by different properties. This is similar to the idea of emergent
multi-level systems in complexity science (e.g. Beurier et al., 2002): but with
the difference that it is not excluded to micro to macro emergence, where macro-
patterns emerge from a set of interacting micro-objects. Instead, the capacity of
humans to relate and act upon emergent structures results in that emergence tends
to go in more than one direction: interaction is not limited to a single stratum;
emergence can occur from interaction between social structures and the actors
that underlie them. This idea of emergence as going in all directions rather than
only “upward”, is a central difference between natural and social systems. One
way to describe this is as going from a Darwinian “population thinking” to an
“organization thinking”, in which no relevant population can be discerned, and
variation/selection are inadequate to describe change, which is rather based on a
modality of “organizational self-transformation” (Lane et al., 2009a). While the
natural world is often seen as hierarchical, the social world is better described
as consisting of sets of nested structures, and its effect on actors as “a plurality
of interpenetrating constraints deriving from many recognisable ‘levels’ looping
back and around each other” (Dyke, 1988, p.64). In fact, as we have seen, this
hierarchical perspective likely does not even apply to many of the systems in the
natural world, but is rather a feature of the models that have been applied in this
context (see e.g. Hendrichs, 1983; Khalil, 1995).
This takes us away from an understanding of “explanation” that is in line
with crude naturalism’s tendency of reducing phenomena to underlying levels,
exemplified by analytic sociology’s idea of “carefully dissecting” social pro-
cesses into their underlying component parts and their actions (Hedström, 2005,
p.73). Instead of, as suggested by analytical sociologists and complexity theo-
rists alike, asserting the individual level as a conditio sine qua non for social sci-
entific explanations, we should aim for a “multiscaled social reality” (DeLanda,
2006, p.34-40) – because regardless of how “complex” the individualism of these
approaches, it is still individualism (Wan, 2011). The multiscaled perspective
suggests a social explanation that makes structure part of the process, having a
methodology and ontology that allows for nested but interpenetrating systems
with causal powers running in all directions.
This emphasizes tracing the interaction within and between strata, as emer-
gence is not seen as a macro appearing from the dynamics of the micro, but
as a continual process between levels. Emergence can be explained – at least
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in principle – in terms of elements and interactions, as suggested by Bunge’s
(1979b) “rational emergentism”. This implies a rejection both of individualism
and holism in favor of an approach that, while explaining phenomena in terms
of generative mechanisms in deeper strata of existence, does not see the higher
properties and powers as “explained away” by such an explanation (Danermark
et al., 1997; Elder-Vass, 2010), since “explained novelty is no less novel than
unexplained novelty” (Mahner and Bunge, 1997, p.29). We can, at least in cer-
tain cases, trace relational emergence of phenomena to underlying constituents
and their relations, which “allows higher level properties to be explained scien-
tifically,” (Elder-Vass, 2007b, p.415) but due to equifinality and multifinality, we
cannot directly link a macro to a micro, meaning that such explanation “does not
allow them to be replaced with properties of the parts in causal explanations be-
cause it is only when the parts are organized into this particular type of higher
level system that the causal power exists” (Elder-Vass, 2007b, p.415).
While reductionism is deeply problematic as a research strategy, amounting
to “the methodological principle according to which (micro)reduction is in all
cases necessary and sufficient to account for wholes and their properties” (Bunge,
2012, p.178), reduction is often desirable and fruitful, such as when part of a
productive research strategy in wicked systems, “reduction does not imply lev-
eling: it relates levels instead of denying that they exist” (Bunge, 1977a, p.79).
Reduction is important, as emergence should be explained rather than dodged,
while ontological novelty at every level should at the same time be acknowl-
edged. Both the phenomenon and its underlying mechanisms remain as real and
with their separate powers and properties: social explanation always involves a
meeting between structure and agency, and is played out as a co-acting between
people and the cultural and social structures they encounter, use and embody;
“structures which position them, motivate them, circumscribe their options and
their capacity to respond” (Carter and New, 2005).
3.3 Explanation in Wicked Systems
This also has implications for the type of explanation employed. Abbott (2001b,
p.164) separates between two such approaches in sociology: the variable-based
approach, which focuses on stochastic realizations and uses correlations between
variables to try to find causal links, and the narrative-based approach, which
instead focuses on identifying mechanisms and categories by looking at patterns
in data (Abbott, 2001b; Abell, 2004; Calhoun, 1998; Griffin, 1993).
The variable-based explanation, related with a regularity or succession the-
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ory of causality associated with empiricism, implies treating wicked systems as
complicated, through the formulation of thought-up entities – “variables” – that
are purported to interact through causes and effects. Causality is here under-
stood as the relationship between these entities, which also requires that they
are fixed over time, and that they exhibit fixed set of attributes. This is hardly
the general case in wicked systems, although, of course, such assumptions may
be more legit and useful in some cases than in other. Variable-based analysis
usually also assumes that causes are independent, in the sense that there is no
interaction between causal factors. This is also hardly the case in wicked systems
(Marini and Singer, 1988). However, there is also a more fundamental problem
to the approach: variables do not exist in the real world (Byrne, 2002). Bunge
(1985, p.138) puts this succinctly: “in science we handle changing things, not
changeless ones, let alone thingless changes”. Variable-based approaches have
a tendency of losing sight of these rather important facts, and that it is “indi-
viduals whose lives provide the data for the models. Although variables rather
than individual people may become the subjects of the statistician’s narrative, it
is individuals rather than variables who have the capacity to act and reflect on so-
ciety” (Elliott, 1999, p.101-102). This implies a Hempelian banner of causality,
in which “causes” tends to essentially mean “causal variables” (Abbott, 2001b;
Skocpol, 1984), hence describing causality between entities existing in the model,
not in reality. Even a model that successfully accounts, in a statistical sense, for
the variation in some phenomenon, can still tell “us rather little about just what
is going on at the level of social processes and action that underlie [...] the in-
terplay of the variables that have been distinguished” (Goldthorpe, 1997, p.9).
Hence, this seems to be yet another example of the social life of methods, as the
variable-based approach implies an understanding of the system as artificial and
complicated.
Narrative-based explanation essentially relies on treating wicked systems as
subwicked, on being compatible with how actors of these systems understand
their environment, and on fundamental human cognitive capacities in relation to
such systems. Such an approach has the benefit of matching the ontology of the
system5, suggesting the possibility of “narratives as a fundamental foundation of
5It should be noted that our language itself brings with it pieces of implicit ontology, that are
brought into our narratives, mathematical models, and everything in between. Such a conception
of the role of language is of course part and parcel of e.g. discourse analysis, but has has also
been the subject of some interesting formal study, in particular in the context of probability theory.
An example of this is Goodman’s new riddle of induction, which shows how Bayesian induction
is based on the assumption of our language’s concepts matching natural kinds (Godfrey-Smith,
2009). This illustrates how ontological assumptions are part of language, how formal models are
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complexity research” (Byrne and Callaghan, 2013, p.202). This match can be
seen in the affordances in narratives when it comes to complex causality, time,
and multi-level explanation. As Abbott (2001a, p.101) puts it: “reality occurs not
as time-bounded snapshots within which “causes” affect one another ... but as
stories, cascades of events. And events, in this sense, are not single properties,
or simple things, but complex conjunctures in which complex actors encounter
complex structures.” Temporal sequence is crucial in these stories, and a different
order of events may produce different outcome (Griffin, 1993), as well as for
allowing for both multiple temporal levels and the real complexities of causality
(Ricoeur, 1980).
In narrative theory, the focus is on events rather than variables, and the entities
involved are not ontologically fixed as the story plays out – entities participate in
events and change over time. This takes us from a “push-type causality” to one
which requires tracing of events, and one which allows patterns on different time-
scales and structural level to interact and play out a common story (Poole et al.,
2000). An event and process focused approach does however not imply advo-
cating a process ontology, in the sense of seeing entities not as “the fundamental
categories of being” but as “derivative of or based in process” (Sawyer, 2005,
p.134); as Sawyer continues, “an empirical focus on practice does not require a
process ontology. One could accept the traditional ‘entity’ view that individuals
and groups both exist and nonetheless argue that it is methodologically necessary
to study situated practices” (Sawyer, 2005, p.134).
Narrative-based explanation focuses on identifying mechanisms through pat-
tern, which signifies a move from aggregation and variance, to categorization
and pattern-finding, and using comparison between cases to find relevant mech-
anisms (Byrne, 2005; Byrne and Ragin, 2009). The two research strategies pro-
posed by critical realists are highly relevant here, as they allow connecting events
and phenomena to mechanism-based explanations: retroduction and retrodiction.
Retroduction is to identify the causal powers that act upon events, the entities
that possess these properties and powers, and the underlying mechanisms (Sayer,
2010), while retrodiction aims to explain how these can combine to produce the
events in question (Danermark et al., 1997). This view and approach to explana-
tion speaks especially to a current development within Complexity Science, with
a move from simulation models based on ad hoc assumptions, towards research
on digital trace data, for example in the emerging discipline of computational so-
cial science (see e.g. Conte et al., 2012; Jungherr, 2015). This development has
often built on less rigid foundations than one may conclude, and constitutes a more formal way to
shed light on the depth of the problem of dealing with change of kind.
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clear potential for supporting a more ontologically plausible approach to wicked
systems.
3.4 Data Mining and Categorization in Wicked Systems
As we have seen, dynamical complexity implies that mechanisms can be dis-
tributed within a system, rather than located in any specific component, imply-
ing that “cause is a property of complex and contingent mechanisms in reality”
(Byrne and Ragin 2009, p.515, see also Coverdill et al. 1994). The contextual
nature of wicked systems implies that cause is not universal or permanent, but
rather local and temporary. Such a perspective has traditionally been understood
through qualitative rather than quantitative reasoning, in part since “quantitative”
tends to mean “variable-based”. In other words, a narrative and complex cau-
sation perspective has tended to imply that we rarely use formal tools when ap-
proaching data. This is problematic, as complexity is a real and important part
of these systems and, as we have seen, high structural and dynamic complexity
limits how far we can go without the aid of formal tools. In other words, neither
the traditional quantitative or qualitative approaches are adequate in approaching
wicked systems.
The increasing proliferation of digital trace data and sophisticated analytic
methods, implying a convergence of qualitative and quantitative approaches, has
important potential here. These seem to be capable of supporting a narrative-
based reasoning while at the same time being capable of increasing the capacity
to deal with high structural and dynamic complexity. This potential is however
not without possible issues: many argue that the digital humanities and com-
putational social science are fostering weak, surface analysis, rather than deep,
penetrating insights, much due to the exclusive focus on computational models
(e.g. Kitchin and Lauriault, 2014). The fields are argued to be reductionist and
crude in their application and interpretation of the techniques – sacrificing con-
text, clarity, and critique for the automatic identification of large-scale patterns,
predicated in the notion that breadth could replace depth and context as basis for
interpretation. This seems to in turn be based in the confusion of the mere iden-
tification of pattern with the explanation of human behavior; as Kitchin (2014)
succinctly points out: “It is one thing to identify patterns; it is another to explain
them”. Even if, as Anderson (2008) argues, such methods are commercially valu-
able due to their predictive capacities, this does not necessarily make them useful
for scientific inquiry: “It is possible to predict well without explaining anything
about what is going on” (Hedström, 2005, p.107). As Kurki (2008, p.166) puts
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it, “what is important in tracking causal connection is not identification of law-
like regularities or empirical observerables, but, rather, the description of the real
properties, structures and generative mechanisms that underlie the actualization
of events and their empirical observations”.
This tendency of pattern-finding in digital trace data research may further-
more be linked to a tendency of thinking that interpretation can be altogether
removed from the equation, and that content analysis should be analytic, quantita-
tive, and what is understood as “objective” (Anderson, 2008; boyd and Crawford,
2012). This ambition is deeply flawed. Whether one admits it or not, the con-
struction of the corpus, tool, and statistical results are all types of interpretation –
it does not become less, but more, interpretative, with more steps between corpus
and conclusion (Byrne, 2002; Kritzer, 1996). This only leads to the reification of
what basically amounts to a form of glorified variables, whose subjective nature
is merely hidden under a thin veneer. Through formal models, one may con-
ceal subjectivity behind computational or mathematical forms of representation,
hiding the normative decisions of framing by enciphering the assumptions and
normative choices in technical code (Feenberg, 1991).
There are however directions of digital analysis that are built on more theo-
retically sound foundations. These methods tend to build on using comparison
and categorization, which in turn build on similarity/difference rather than vari-
ance analysis, with the aim of finding patterns that give leads on the underlying
mechanisms which shape phenomena in the observed processes (Skocpol, 1984).
The idea of using comparison and categorization is a hopeful one, as it steps
away from the complicated system idea of seeing causes as single factors whose
presence inevitably generates an effect and whose absence means that the effect
does not occur, toward a conception of causality more compatible with wicked
systems . The typical example of such a research approach is Darwin’s Origin of
Species, where a large number of case studies were combined to find a powerful
emergent generative mechanism (Byrne and Callaghan, 2013).
Two examples of such systematic comparison techniques are Qualitative Com-
parative Analysis and cluster analysis (Cooper et al., 2012). These, in particular
QCA, come out of the realist tradition’s focus on case study based research, in
which case studies has been regarded as the primary research design (Easton,
1998), due to their potential to, in the case of single-case studies, reveal the gener-
ative mechanisms in specific contexts, and in the case of multi-case comparisons,
identifying situations or contexts in which similar mechanisms operate (Ackroyd,
2009). This way of combining narrative explanation within cases, and systematic
comparison across, suggests a middle path between quantitative and qualitative
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social research (Cooper et al., 2012), since, in contrast to variable-based methods
or controlled experiment which deals in single causes, such methods are capable
of including more than one cause. Causation is in these methods understood in
terms of a combination of factors in interaction, and there is explicit recognition
of “causal complexity” (Coverdill et al., 1994, p.57). Furthermore, these meth-
ods are capable of dealing with contingency and contextual dependency of social
causality, as they are capable of investigating situations where equifinality and
multifinality apply.
These techniques are also useful as a starting-point to think of other devel-
oping analytic techniques, that go outside the quantitative-qualitative divide in
similar ways. For example, Paper IV shows how it is possible to approach certain
text analytic techniques through a similar theoretical lens, by using Topic Mod-
eling (Blei, 2012) in combination with close-reading to explore large quantities
of textual data. Topic models cluster textual data, and is commonly used to give
an overview over large data quantities. However, while informative, such analy-
sis runs the risk of reifying resulting “topics”, in the same way as variables are
reified within variance analysis: we end up essentially telling a story of the rise
and fall of something that does not actually exist, and to add insult to injury, the
complexity of the algorithms turns it into even more of a black-box than most
traditional variance studies.
We instead suggest an alternative approach, using topics not as reified en-
tities, but as a basis of a type of explorative sampling, and a way to provide a
map through which the material may be explored in various levels of detail. This
exploration was performed using a custom-developed text analysis platform, de-
signed for this type of computationally-assisted exploration, which treats compu-
tational methods not as a replacement, but as aids to human intuition and inter-
pretation, and an extension of human cognitive capacities. In this integrated in-
terpretation environment, automatic analysis provides a discursive landscape that
the researcher can “zoom” into, and combine various types of analysis to find
traces of the underlying meaning. The framework does permit the use of some
variance-analysis as well, but in a way in which these are explicitly designed to
function as variance traces, rather than as reifications.
The notion underlying this platform is essentially that methods will always
have a social life (Law et al., 2011), meaning that they will always tend to drive
ontology: human cognition has an inherent tendency to reify and create stories
around whatever measures we devise6. Hence, it becomes necessary to design
6This is part of a wider argument regarding the relationship between the technological and the
social, or base and superstructures, if you will, that was hinted at in chapter 2.
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methods in such a way that they afford a methodology that is in line with a rea-
sonable ontological understanding of the system under study.
The approach to data that is supported by this platform is not a matter of
testing pre-established hypotheses, but rather of a quantitative (Martindale and
West, 2002) or computational hermeneutics (Mohr et al., 2015): continuing re-
engagement with the data that mixes levels of interpretation and analysis, predi-
cated on the idea that “[e]xploration is the real and serious game” (Byrne, 2002).
3.5 Facing Emergence in Wicked Systems
Categorization and comparison can indeed be highly useful for finding macro-
patterns in data and to use as basis for the identification of generative mecha-
nisms. However, it will not necessarily take us all the way to identifying the
underlying mechanisms at play. Dynamical complexity may often lead to phe-
nomena resulting from unintuitive combinations of factors, which we can do no
better than black-boxing under the label of “emergence”. Just as we cannot ap-
proach digital trace data without algorithmic aid, we cannot unpack such black-
boxes, or, in Wan’s (2011) terminology, solve the “problem of transformation”.
We may ponder potential generative mechanisms, but without aid, we have no
way of determining whether those in fact even have the potential of generating
the identified causal patterns.
This is where simulation models come in. Simulation permits quantitative
studies of mass-interaction and a de-mystification of emergence (an idea that has
in a more mysterious and metaphysical form been around since Aristotle’s Meta-
physics: “the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something
besides the parts”, cited in Cohen 2010):
Simulations are partly responsible for the restoration of the legiti-
macy of the concept of emergence because they can stage interac-
tions between virtual entities from which properties, tendencies, and
capacities actually emerge. Since this emergence is reproducible in
many computers it can be probed and studied by different scientists
as if it were a laboratory phenomenon. (DeLanda, 2011, p.6)
By translating narrative descriptions into a simulation model, we can see
whether they produce the hypothesized emergent result (McGlade, 2014). How-
ever, due to equifinality and multifinality, doing so will not tell us as much as one
might think: if they do produce the emergent phenomenon, we cannot know for
sure that they are indeed the generative mechanisms at play in the real system,
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and if they do not, we cannot even know that they are not the generating mecha-
nisms. This does however not mean that such models are useless: what we do get
is a link between a micro-level mechanism and a macro-level phenomenon in a
complex system, which may or may not “shine through” in the actual system, as
there is not a single mechanism at play but rather multitudes of interacting mech-
anisms. This is the reason why we should not think of open systems in terms
of laws, and why it is instead more useful to talk about tendencies, “which may
be possessed unexercised and exercised unrealized, just as they may of course be
realized unperceived (or undetected) by anyone” (Bhaskar, 2010, p.13); a sys-
tem may have a tendency for certain phenomena, but it might not be realized in
the empirical system if it is inhibited by other mechanisms. In wicked systems,
causes are not as single factors whose presence inevitably generates an effect and
whose absence means that the effect does not occur, rather, cause is a property of
a combination of a range of local, temporary and contingent mechanisms.
This means that one should approach empirical regularities with some cau-
tion, as they will be local in space and time. Phenomena are complex entangled
effects from the influence of multiple interacting mechanisms, reinforcing or can-
celling each other out, and so objects should be seen as having forces whether
these forces are displayed or not. Conversely, the question of the most impor-
tant mechanism for a specific phenomenon can only be decided on a case-to-case
basis based on specific empirical investigations.
Due to this complex causation, many wicked problems are so unique and
contingent that modeling makes no sense. In some cases, however, certain mech-
anisms do tend to “crowd out” others, and shine through into the macro-level
system despite of the multitude of other interacting factors, possibly generating
regularities: “Over restricted regions of time-space certain mechanisms may ...
be reproduced continuously and come to be (occasionally) apparent in their ef-
fects at the level of actual phenomena, giving rise to rough and ready generalities
or partial regularities, holding to such a degree that prima facie an explanation is
called for” (Lawson, 1995, p.26). This is related to the concept of “control param-
eters” (e.g. Scheffer and Carpenter, 2003) in complexity science: at given points
of time, certain mechanisms tend to dominate the system dynamics, and tuning
certain parameters may disproportional affect the system. Using simulations, we
can go some way in determining the relative importance of a given mechanism for
the system dynamics: simulation conclusions are usually only tested for stability
in the parameter space, but it is also possible – although only rather arduously –
to explore their stability in the algorithmic space, i.e. in the space of interaction
with other mechanisms. This can be informative with regard to whether an emer-
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gent effect will be likely dominate a system despite embedment in the richness
of real open systems. For example, congestion emerges quite robustly in systems
of interacting cars in traffic (e.g. Bando et al., 1995): we have found that entire
classrooms of students independently developing models – according to whatever
assumptions and methods of implementation they find reasonable – will almost
in every case produce models exhibiting the same phenomenon, implying an al-
gorithmically highly stable phenomenon.
This furthermore illustrates an alternative way of thinking of models than
what is represented by e.g. Hedström (2005), who departs from an analytical
sociology perspective. Hedström refers to models that do not engage with data
as “fictions”, arguing that they have no connection to reality from which their
“isomorphism” and “validity” can be assessed – they are “no mode of calibra-
tion” (Hedström and Åberg, 2005). This idea of validation and isomorphism
has exactly the platonic flavor to it which Hayles (1999) picks up on in her cri-
tique: it presupposes an idea that models are useful to the extent that they match
an imagined ideal form of system – a form that is just perpetually out of our
reach. The result of trying to reach for that platonic world is models that become
increasingly complicated and specific, in the attempt to reach that ever-evasive
“realism”. Since they cannot intermix with the viewpoints, knowledge and expe-
riences of the participants, this causes them to lose their real source of usefulness
(e.g. Klosterman, 2012). They will not only fail the goal of being “realistic” rep-
resentations of reality, but also their goal of functioning as useful metaphors and
pedagogical tools helping us building a better intuition for complex dynamics. As
Macy and Willer (2002, p.147) put it: “making these models more realistic in-
evitably adds complexity that undermines their usefulness as tools for theoretical
research if we can no longer figure out how the model produces a given result.”
Good simulations can function as computationally-assisted thought-experiments,
contributing ideas about how emergence can play out in closed systems, and we
can use them as crutches for our flawed intuition for complex dynamics when
describing and thinking about wicked systems.
At their best, models allow us to develop concepts about emergence like
“threshold”, “tipping-point”, “feedback”, or “cascade”, that have been immensely
useful in elucidating emergent dynamics in wicked systems. Such concepts do
not in themselves constitute claims: “it is undisputed today that concepts can
neither be true nor correct, but that they are only instruments, which prove to be
more or less suitable when it comes to the correct ascertainment of truths and/or
untruths”7 (Luhmann 1992, p.390 cited in and translated by Wan 2011, p.36). In
7In the German original: “Unbestritten ist heute, dass Begriffe weder wahr noch richtig sein
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Bunge’s words, concepts cannot be “tested, because they neither assert nor deny
anything. Hence there are no true or false concepts: concepts can only be exact or
fuzzy, applicable or inapplicable, fruitful or barren” (Bunge, 1996, p.49). These
concepts, if proved the former rather than the latter, can then be used in state-
ments and theories the world, and it is the world that determines the truthfulness
of these statements and theories (Christis, 2001). This view of simulation, as a
way to develop powerful metaphors (Thrift, 1999), as well as concepts for com-
plex dynamics that may then be used to formulate claims about wicked systems,
represents a radically different view on the use and understanding of modeling
compared both to analytical sociology and mainstream Complexity Science. The
reductionist perspective often uses ‘merely metaphorical’ as a form of critique,
but in a wicked world, metaphors are what we live by (Byrne and Callaghan,
2013, p.6)
The main limitations of the use of simulation models in wicked systems is
hence not, as Hedström and Åberg (2005) might suggest, the necessity to make
assumptions about underlying mechanisms, but rather that they are limited to first
order emergence. This is not a problem for the results of simulation as such, since
first-order emergence is important in a large range of systems. It does, however,
constrain what can be studied with their aid. Remember that wickedness means
that the rules of the game change on the same timescale as the game is played,
and in interaction with the gameplay. Simulation models in comparison, oper-
ate by fixed rules, which have pre-assigned meaning8: “[e]very interaction is a
product of rules because the agents are only autonomous in terms of the imple-
mentation of their rules” (Byrne, 2002, p.136). Taking real social action – the
way individuals actively interact with social structures – into account requires
an understanding of how humans understand emergence. This, as we have seen,
implies theories of meaning, value, and narratives. Because of this, it is hard to
imagine modeling that would support the general study of second-order emer-
gence (Gilbert, 2002), as they would need to share the wickedness of the system
under study.
There is, however, an underused potential in including institutions and social
structures as real and active actors in the simulations. For example, I have su-
pervised a student project looking at the conflict between opinion dynamics on
the micro- (e.g. relative agreement) and macro-level (e.g. spatial voting). Con-
können, sondern dass sie nur Instrumente sind, die sich als mehr oder weniger geeignet erweisen,
wenn es um die richtige Feststellung von Wahrheiten bzw. Unwahrheiten geht.” (Luhmann, 1992,
p.390)
8Genetic programming is an exception to this that proves the point: the results of such systems
tend to be as flexible as they are hard interpret.
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tradictory results are often found on these two levels (e.g. Deffuant et al., 2002;
Downs, 1957), and the aim was to see which effect that would dominate a system
in which both played out. Such simulations, which grants causal status to social
entities, may allow us to better understand emergence “that runs in every direc-
tion” (Byrne and Callaghan, 2013), and not only micro-to-macro, even if they
cannot fully take social action into account and do not bring us into the realm of
second order emergence.
Again, the almost singular focus on micro-emergence does not need to be a
deal-breaker if we are operating from the perspective of the complexity-toolkit-
as-computational-hermeneutics. The purpose is not to completely explain or cap-
ture the system, but rather to contribute yet another heuristic tool to a toolkit,
bringing a host of qualitative and quantitative techniques, to be brought into an in-
tegrative and iterative engagement for the understanding of social systems. Such
an approach is exemplified by Paper V, which suggests that part of the observed
importance of free social spaces for radical social mobilization is emergent and
based in network structural effects, in the form of interaction between network
clusters and political deviance. Rather than singularly focusing on the model in
itself, as a reified entity, the paper attempts to integrate these ideas into a larger
narrative grounded in the literature. This is not an easy task, considering the ten-
sion between “the gang [who] can count but don’t know what they are counting”
(Byrne, 2002, p.15) and the gang who “can’t count, won’t count, and assert that
counting is a vile and perverse activity which ought not to be allowed” (Byrne,
2002, p.15) running high, but it is a necessary one if simulation is to become a
constructive part of social scientific work.
3.6 Integrated Pluralism - Tying Together Traces
Simulation models are not unique in their assumptions of closure, as “all theoris-
ing in science [...] involve some partial or temporary closure” (Hodgson, 2006,
p.3). As we have seen, openness means that there are no universal methods that
can be used to study all aspects of reality. The bad news is that this, in practice,
lays waste to any project aiming at “realistic” rather than “unrealistic” models and
assumptions: all theories are abstractions, partial, and unrealistic (Mäki, 1992).
The good news is that this does not mean that modeling is meaningless,
but rather that it speaks to the increasingly influential philosophy of pragmatism
(Baert, 2005); “All models are wrong, but some are useful” (Box et al., 1987), or
put inversely: “Everything is lawful, but not everything is beneficial” (1 Corinthi-
ans 10:23). This proposes seeing models as tools, rather than descriptions of re-
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ality: “a theory is not really to be believed to give us a truthful picture of what the
world is like, it is rather to be used as a useful tool for whatever purposes there
may be” (Mäki, 2001, p.10). But it does not necessarily lead to a complete instru-
mentalism, as there is, at least to some extent, a “difference between descriptively
false and descriptively incomplete statements” (Hedström, 2005, p.20), and the
usefulness of a model is “a product of the fact that [it] contains a good deal of
truth” (Wimsatt, 2007, p.392).
While wicked systems cannot be reduced to any single model, different mod-
els are capable of casting light at different aspects of them – giving us what
(Byrne, 1998) calls “traces of reality”. This can be illustrated with economic the-
ory, in which, undeniably, neoclassical, complexity and heterodox economics all
have contributed many useful models and studies. This is despite their fundamen-
tally contradictory – and, I would argue in the case of neoclassical economics,
blatantly erroneous – understanding of the ontological nature of economic reality
(for a complex realist perspective on economic theory, see see Törnberg 2016b).
As this example shows, even mathematics need not be employed as a map of
reality or for prediction, but can also be approached as explanatory heuristics
(Hodgson, 2013; Sugden, 2000). The key point is to not confuse the “ontic” and
the “theoretic” (Lawson, 2005) in either direction, i.e. not to reject methods due
to issues with their ontology, nor to reject the reality due to issues with one’s
method.
This integrative approach of letting an “ontology that proclaims both the di-
versity and the unity of the world” (Bunge, 1973, p.162) guide the methodology,
which Danermark et al. (1997) call “critical method pluralism”, Bunge (1973,
p.162) calls “integrated pluralism” and Mitchell (2002) calls “integrative plural-
ism”, has been systematized in various ways (e.g. method triangulation, com-
bined operations and mixed strategies; e.g. Thurmond 2001) and is gaining sig-
nificant traction in sociology (Danermark et al., 1997). This view suggests that
social science should be question-driven, allowing the nature of their inquiry to
guide their methods, rather than the other way around, while avoiding “the confu-
sion between a factual item such as a mechanism, and any of its models” (Bunge,
2004a, p.375). This in turn requires the formulation of an ontology of the sys-
tem under study; a fixed-point from which to pose the questions, or, as Lawson
(2006b, p.47) puts it, “to focus competently on specific aspects requires an un-
derstanding of the totality”.
Binding together the various traces of reality, acquired through a multitude
of methods, into a coherent whole requires narratives: the narrative has strong
aligning and integrating functions and can form the “glue” in iterative cycles
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of sub-wicked approaches. The ontological flexibility of the narrative allows it
to bind together and interpret results from multiple sources for traces of reality,
while sketching out their limitations in scope, hence functioning as descriptions
of the trajectories of wicked systems. There will clearly come multiple stories
from such scientific work – all potentially compatible with the available data –
and it should be noted that the integrative approach aims at bringing together
not only different models, but also stories: there is usually more value viewing
them as perspectives that cast light from different direction on the same issue,
rather than as competing truths; we should hence “try to integrate all the fields of
knowledge that study the same objects” (Wan, 2011, p.53).
Such an integrative approach also implies a clear step away from the notion
of science as ideally objective and external, admitting instead for the relational
condition of social science: that the scientist is an inseparable part of the subject
of study, hence inevitably affecting reality through its study (Bhaskar, 1979).
This can be illustrated by the development of the postmodernist theory itself, as
the postmodernist crisis in knowledge was not caused by theory alone, but is a
response to real changes in society. Again, reality has a voice in the formation
of theory; it is the complexity of postmodern society that has generated the crisis
of knowledge – but these changes in theory have also had important implications
for that same reality: again, the two interact and co-evolve.
Since reality cannot be captured in its entirety, but only from a frame of ref-
erence, and we will impact the system by deciding on a perspective, theorizing
becomes a type of practice. Furthermore, reality speaks to us through how our
theories affect it: if theory is practice and prediction is impossible, the only way
to evaluate our work is the change that our practice makes. Hence, while in closed
systems, objective study may be possible, and the point can be to predict, for so-
cietal systems, the point is to change it. This is not to say that theorists should
become activist – it is to claim that they already are.
The real question is whether we should be activists for the hegemony and the
status quo, or for societal change. Formal models are no less activist because
they conceal normative decisions of framing by enciphering them in technical
code (Feenberg, 1991). But, as Byrne and Callaghan (2013) note, there is a clear
tendency for such ostensible neutrality of scientific work to serve what Gramsci
called the hegemony. The reason for this tendency is the social life of the neces-
sary assumption of fixed ontologies that makes the world seem like it is playing
out from a set of fixed rules, with the resulting emergent effects seeming natural
and inevitable. Mainstream Complexity Science has often been guilty of this, as
exemplified by the description of Pareto wealth distributions as a “natural” result
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of interaction dynamics, implying a certain inevitability by neglecting the pos-
sibility for qualitative change of underlying rules (perhaps to a system in which
poverty is not “natural”). Again, such limitations are fine when they are merely
methodological – it is with their transformation into a tacit and unexamined on-
tology/ideology that they become problematic.
An alternative to being affected by the social life of one’s methods in this
way, is to take a more explicit and active engagement with the system under
study. Indeed, Cilliers (1998) focused strongly on the ethical implications of
Complexity Science, and based on this he argued that it was even unethical to
attempt to engage with societal systems from the outside. He is not alone in these
considerations. Gerrits (2012) argues in the context of policy interventions that
it is necessary for “the complexity researcher to be engaged with her subjects,
both for deeper scientic understanding and better policy information” (Gerrits,
2012, p.181); we need to engage with the actors who are part of the situation, and
to take account of their respective narratives, if we are to fully understand their
meaning. As Byrne and Callaghan (2013, p.208) argue: “good social knowledge
of complex social systems is based on co-production between social scientists
and the human agents in the field of investigation”. This notion of co-production
takes us beyond dialogue and into the realm of action9.
3.7 To Change it
As we have seen, social and environmental unsustainability is strongly linked to
the emergent properties of wicked systems: these systems are arenas for compe-
tition fought out through innovation, and this constant innovation has in human
society been reified into a goal in its own right. This innovation is resulting in an
increasingly global society, leveraged by increasingly diverse and versatile tech-
nologies and strategies (e.g. Beinhocker, 2006, p.6), and fueled by accelerating
resource use (Steffen et al., 2015a), which has transformed human society into
a major driver of planetary systems (e.g. Biermann, 2014; Steffen et al., 2015b;
Zalasiewicz et al., 2011). At the same time, increasing sociotechnical intercon-
nectedness, fueled by strongly innovation-oriented economic and ideological sys-
tems, has made this society more prone to uncontrollable cascade effects, with
lower resilience to stress and an amplification of problems from local to more
global scales (e.g. Folke et al., 2010; Helbing, 2013; Lane, 2011a). This devel-
opment has brought about increasingly severe and interconnected crises; e.g. the
9Thereby also connecting with the rather large strand of literature associated to action research,
e.g. Argyris et al. 1985; Byrne 2011; Reason and Bradbury 2001; Whyte 1991
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climate crisis, biodiversity crisis, refugee crisis, financial crisis, and so on. The
political reponse to this “crisis of crises” (e.g. Beddoe et al., 2009; Lane et al.,
2011) – which tend to emphasize prediction, planning and control – has been
inadequate both in its ability to align around a common direction and in level-
ling action (e.g. Castree et al., 2014; Haasnoot et al., 2013; Leach et al., 2010;
Loorbach, 2010). Instead, the political has largely been reduced to priming the
pump of innovation, in an attempt to innovate out of a hole that was created by
innovation – disregarding overview and direction for the benefit of locally driven
change. This is resulting in cycles of problem-solution-problem, in the end pro-
ducing merely profit and new problems (Lane, 2016).
This points to a confounding assymmetry in the human condition – between
our ability to transform the world and our profound lack of understanding of the
very world which our own strength has established; our power over the world
seems to be increasing at the same rate as our ability to control this power is
diminishing. This assymmetry is rooted in a fundamental aspect of the seam-
less webs of wicked systems, in which understanding and controlling demands
a global overview, but growth and change requires only local and myopic ac-
tion. The former entails untangling a socio-eco-technical web of feedback and
threshold effects, intertwined drivers and deep uncertainty; the latter, in compar-
ison, merely entails the innovation of artifacts that thrives locally in the societal
system over the short term. Hence, our world is pushed forward in its track not
by rational decision-making based on in-depth understanding of the problems at
hand, but rather through the invention and marketing of products; cascades of
myopic innovation launching us in directions that we cannot predict or control
(see Lane, 2011a). More succintly put, promethean powers are being exercised
in a society of beings too absorbed in consumption to take any responsibility for
the world (Arendt, 1958, p.XV).
This fundamental unsustainability harks back to the development of a so-
ciotechnical system – the interweaving of social life with threads of materiality –
that enabled the dynamics of self-driving innovation. This afforded an emergent
feedback process of constant acceleration, putting mankind at the mercy of the
thoughtless invention of every artifact which is technically possible, no matter
how destructive. The unsustainability of these artifacts is only a competitive dis-
advantage in so far as it becomes a problem before the civilization has had time
to eliminate its competition, which in practice means that there is little selection
pressure for long-term sustainability. In other words, while the current crisis of
crises is neither an historical coincidence, nor a biological exigence, it is a strong
historical attractor following from the development of a sociotechnical innovation
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system.
Our unsustainability is deeply linked to a defining aspect of wicked systems –
the fact that humanity as a whole does not fulfill any functionality; our collective
behavior is merely the accumulation of externalities of underlying processes that
are never evaluated on the systemic level. Humans are all “the helpless victims of
a mechanism which is nothing but the cumulative effect of their own strategies,
engendered and amplified by the logic of competition of everyone against every-
one.” (Bourdieu, 1998, p.27). In other words, there is no collective “us” that has
taken us to where we are – “at no moment did the species vote for it either with
feet or ballots” (Malm and Hornborg, 2014, p.64). But neither is there a “human-
ity” that could take charge of events, and consciously make its own future: human
beings are plural and mortal, and it is these features of the human condition that
give politics both its openness and its desperate contingency: no snowflake in an
avalanche ever feels responsible.
This does not mean that this condition cannot be changed, or that we cannot
construct governance structures that can lever our collectivity into new “societal
actors” (Knight, 2015) capable of instilling our processes of innovation with a
necessary level of collective agency. Negotiation and narratives have the power
to form local alignment in seamless webs, allowing us to steer the direction of
innovation, and thereby of wicked systems. In Hannah Arendt’s words: “when
plural persons come together to bind themselves for the future, the covenants they
create among themselves can throw ‘islands of predictability’ into the ‘ocean
of uncertainty”’ (Arendt, 1958, p.xix). Technological change has enabled new
forms of collaboration and new ways to come together, which is simultaneously
enabling alternative economic organizations, and clashing with important tenets
of the old systems (Castells, 2002, 2011; Mason, 2016).
Innovation is by definition needed to solve the meta-crisis, but at the same
time, it is also what caused the crisis – innovation as constituted by our current
processes of innovation. Since the necessary social transformations is unlikely to
be generated by the same structures and processes that caused it, what is needed is
meta-innovation: an alternative sociotechnical regime for innovation. But as we
have seen, there appears to be no off-the-shelf approaches for organizing innova-
tion in ways that lead to a sustainable path into the future. The meta-perspective
of viewing the structures and processes of innovation as regimes (Geels, 2005;
Grübler, 2003) – constructing niches and themselves becoming entrenched – was
useful to understanding the problems we face, and can be similarly useful in find-
ing a solution: new forms of innovation and production, unattached to the struc-
tures of the current regime of innovation and instead belonging to a new cluster
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of societal organization, can contribute to the formation of scaffolding structures
facilitating the development of new forms of organization for harnessing innova-
tion.
Harnessing innovation implies developing scaffolding structures capable of
directing and supporting iterative processes of innovation. Through such struc-
tures, collective agency can be instilled into the economic sector, as exempli-
fied by social movements experiments in organizing democratic alternatives to
the atomistic market, for evaluating innovations (see e.g. Fenton-Smith, 2015).
This literally brings in collective agency into the innovation process, and sug-
gests a way in which scaffolding structures for supporting social innovation can
emerge within civil society (Lane et al., 2011). Underlying this is an alternative
view of socio-eco-technological systems, characterized by multidimensionality,
path-dependency and unpredictability (e.g. Bai et al., 2015; Beddoe et al., 2009;
Berkhout, 2002; Folke et al., 2002, 2010; Rip and Kemp, 1998). These qualities
– all related to ideas about complexity – are seen as irreducible root causes of
the crises that we face and of our inability to predict, prevent and deal with them.
The main lesson is that we must harness and embrace these troublesome qualities
rather than vainly attempt to plan and control them away.
Chapter4
Conclusion
This essay has aimed to cast light on the borderlands between the natural and so-
cial sciences with the purpose of developing a complexity-informed understand-
ing of the ontological distinctiveness of social systems. It was noted that, while
complexity has been asociated to an influx of naturalism, the ontological con-
ception of emergence in fact provides a solid foundation for a critique against
crude naturalism, as it suggests the existence of exclusively social entities, re-
quiring their own methodological approaches. This was investigated by attempt-
ing “to analyze and to systematize the ontological categories” (Bunge, 1977b,
p.12) by looking at the interaction between binaries like individuality/artificiality,
emergence/hierarchy, agency/structure, and complexity/complicatedness (Khalil,
1995). This categorization has served as a foundation of a naturalistic perspective
on naturalism, with the conclusion that society, as well as some natural systems,
are fundamentally different in type from the systems among which they are typi-
cally being placed, and that they need to be approached in another way.
We have furthermore noted two ironies in that the reinvigoration of crude nat-
uralism is driven by, on the one hand, increasing impact of social systems on the
natural world, and, on the other, the development of digital data and computa-
tional methods:
For the former, it seems obvious, as Malm and Hornborg (2014) point out,
that the increasing acknowledgement of society’s impact on nature should logi-
cally imply a more profound engagement with social and cultural theory, not in
coaching society in terms of natural science. That humans alter geological layers
does make social science more relevant for geologists, but it does not make geol-
ogists more equipped to study societal processes: as is becoming painfully clear,
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society mostly drives climate change, not the other way around.
The latter is exemplified by Manovich (2016): “Digital is what gave culture
the scale of physics, chemistry or neuroscience. Now we have enough data and
fast enough computers to actually study the ‘physics’ of culture”. The irony here
is that digitalization is part of a development toward technology becoming in-
creasingly liquid (e.g. Archer, 2014; Bauman, 2013), thereby undermining the
ontological stability of culture (e.g. Elder-Vass, 2017). This means that formal
methods are in fact becoming less capable of dealing with society, as their nec-
essary assumption of fixed ontology are becoming increasingly problematic, and
their “short runs” increasingly short (Simon, 1991). In other words, approaching
society as a closed system – as physics, if you will – has in fact never been less
appropriate.
The underlying naturalistic idea that drives both of these developments – that
formal methods constitute a development toward increased predictability, and to-
ward making social science “scientific” – is fundamentally misconceived. As we
have seen, the lack of precision is not a problem of the methods, but part of the
ontological nature of the system: if your prediction is exact in an uncertain sys-
tem, it is certainly exactly wrong. Car repair doesn’t become a social science just
because you start interviewing carburetors – it just makes you a terrible mechanic.
The category of systems to which society belongs – whose components dis-
play both individuality and artificality (Khalil, 1995) – are non-decomposable
(Simon, 1991), which in turn means that their mode of change is, to important
extent, of kind, not of degree. To understand such change, methods based on fixed
ontologies – including quantification and measurement on a ratio scale – will not
be adequate: change of kind implies a change of the very meaning of what is
measured. Instead, cause-and-effects in such systems can be accessed through
the comparison of categories of effects, and from there deducing the causes –
according to the idea that “where there is difference in the effect, there is a dif-
ference in the cause” (MacIver 1942, p.26, cited in Byrne and Callaghan 2013).
However, nota bene that this in no way contradict a computational approach, but
simply implies that the nomothetic program may not be an appropriate founda-
tion for such a pursuit. Computational tools may be highly beneficial for aiding
a program of systematic comparison, as illustrated by the computationally rela-
tively simple tools associated to Qualitative Comparative Analysis (e.g. Rihoux
and Ragin, 2009).
As we have seen, the claims that emergentism and Complexity Science are
anti-reductionist seem to be in practice misleading: complex individualism is
still individualism. The difference between the Platonic backhand and forehand
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(Hayles, 1999) is not between reductionism and emergence, but between com-
ponent and relation reductionism. Since these abstractions are rendered as real,
the corresponding ontologies follow from a lack of distinction between the real
and the artificial. What we need is not to go from “factors to actors” (Macy and
Willer, 2002), but from artificiality to reality (Khalil, 1995).
Instead of approaching naturalism by continuing to “extend the tool found
successful in one domain to decipher the other” (Khalil, 1995, p.414-415), this
essay has suggested taking a turn to ontology in the complexity scientific ap-
proach to societal systems. A set of compatible ideas were found primarily in
critical realism of e.g. Archer et al. (2013), and Bhaskar (2013), and in particular
Reed and Harvey’s (1996; 1992) “complex realism”, further developed by e.g.
Harvey (2009), Byrne (2002, 2004, 2005, 1998), Byrne and Ragin (2009), and
Byrne and Callaghan (2013), as well as in Mario Bunge’s related “emergentist-
systemism” (e.g. Bunge, 1979a, 2000a,b).
Based on a review of these ideas connected to the ontological categorization
of Wicked Systems, this resulted in an approach to societal complexity that:
(i) steps away from the ontological individualism and reductionist explanation
of mainstream Complexity Science, to one that views emergence not as
something that necessarily develops bottom-up, but that can run between
levels and in any and all directions. This furthermore suggests a type of
explanation that does not merely describe underlying elements, but traces
processes through the structures and elements involved.
(ii) focuses on qualitative change – changes in kind rather than only in degree
– suggesting a step away from approaching data through variable-based
methods, to one that instead emphasizes categorization and pattern-finding,
accepts that wicked systems cannot be fully represented in closed models,
and therefore calls for an approach that sees the scientific practice as in-
terpretation rather than as analysis, and aims for exploration rather than
complete explanation or “realistic” representation.
(iii) sees to complex rather than simple causation, and tendencies rather than
laws. This reframes models from attempts to match or access a platonic
ideal form of the system – inevitably resulting in their reification – to in-
dicators giving us traces of reality (Byrne, 1998). This changes our un-
derstanding of the toolkit of complexity from realistic representations of
reality, to parts of a set of “computational hermeneutics”; crutches that
can help our intuition navigate cognitively difficult terrain, but that should
never be expected to walk on their own.
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(iv) takes an integrative and methodologically pluralist approach, allowing on-
tology to guide methodology and focusing on the specific with an under-
standing of the totality, tying together a range of traces to a coherent narra-
tive.
(v) steps away from notions of science as objective and external, admitting
that the social scientist is an inseparable part of the subject of study, mean-
ing that theory becomes a form of practice: we change the world by un-
derstanding it, and we understand it by changing it (Byrne, 2002). Since
description becomes a form of criticism in an unequal and unsustainable
world, this in turn implies active engagement.
To conclude, it should be noted that this does not only bear relevance within
the confines of scientific research; we are ravaging our world with a “perfect
storm” (Pievani, 2014) of interrelated crises of increasing scale and magnitude,
driven, ultimately, by our confounding lack of understanding of the very world
which our own strength has established. It is increasingly understood that this
“crisis of crises” (Beddoe et al., 2009) calls for a fundamental transformation in
how we organize our society – what some call a Great Transition (Raskin et al.,
2002). But at the same time as the capacity to understand large-scale change
is starting to seem increasingly essential for our survival as a species, scientific
research risks withdrawing – driven by scientism and empiricism – to a focus on
small, empirically verifiable study, with any theory left implicit and tacit. But to
see the human impact on the Earth system, and allow us to gaze toward a more
just, equal, and sustainable future, a bigger picture is needed, capable of evoking
the experience of seeing the first photographs of Earth from space: showing our
precious sphere floating in infinite black emptiness; reminding us that we live
on a precarious razor-thin interface between rock and emptiness, between a vast
past and an unknown future, in a moment that is not only remarkable in beauty
but perhaps also in brevity. We need a science capable of seeing not only the
frailty of that reality, but also that another world is possible.
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